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1. INTRODUCTION: SEARCHING FOR THE
ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS
Corporate law in Korea has undergone a dramatic transforma-
tion in recent years. In an effort to revamp Korean corporations,
the Korean government made sweeping reforms to Korea's
Commercial Code (sang-bup) three times in the past four years-
in 1995, 1998, and 1999.' These newly amended provisions have
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1 See Commercial Code, Law No. 1000 of 1962 (as amended Law No. 5053
of 1995, Law No. 5591 of 1998 and Law No. 6086 of 2000) ("KCC"). The cor-
porate law section of Korea's Commercial Code can be found between Articles
169 and 637. In this Article, the changes will be referred to as"1995 KCC,"
"1998 KCC," and "1999 KCC" respectively, and simply "KCC" if no changes
were made in 1995, 1998, or 1999. For a critical view on how the KCC and the
Securities Exchange Act ("SEA") should be amended to harmonize each other,
see Ki-won Choi, IMF ui geuk-bok-eul wui-han sang-bup-gae-jung bang-hyang ()
[How the Korean Commercial Code Should Be Amended to Overcome the IMF
Situation ()], L. TIMES (Seoul), Apr. 13, 1998, at 14.
Other major laws that can apply to corporations include the Civil Code,
the SEA, the Securities Investment Trust Business Act, the Securities Invest-
ment Company Act, the Foreign Exchange Trade Act, the Bankruptcy Act,
and the Composition Act. See Securities Investment Company Act, Law No.
5557 of 1998 (as amended Law No. 6174 of 2000); Foreign Exchange Trade
Act, Law No. 4447 of 1991 (as amended Law No. 5550 of 1998); Securities In-
vestment Trust Business Act, Law No. 2129 of 1969 (as amended Law No.
6179 of 2000); Bankruptcy Act, Law No. 998 of 1962 (as amended Law No.
61115519 of 2000); Composition Act, Law No. 997 of 1962 (as amended Law
No. 6110 of 2000); SEA, Law No. 972 of 1962 (as amended Law No. 6176 of
2000); and Civil Code, Law No. 471 of 1958 (as amended Law No. 5454 of
1997).
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set in motion unprecedented changes for the Korean corporate
environment. Korean management is finally beginning to be
monitored and challenged in a more meaningful manner, while at
the same time, directors and auditors have gained both renewed
authority and responsibilities. Shareholder rights have been
strengthened to levels previously unimaginable by Korean stan-
dards.2 The number of mergers and acquisitions has risen no-
ticeably, and unfriendly corporate takeovers have even been at-
tempted? Although still far from international standards, these
new corporate regulations not only can assist other industrializing
countries that are contemplating similar regulatory changes, but
they can also contribute to the debate surrounding the potential
for global convergence in corporate governance.4
More specifically, the 1995 amendments ("1995 KCC")
marked only the second time that Korea amended its corporate
law section of the KCC since the KCC's initial enactment in
1962.5 The 1995 amendments attempted to address a broad range
2 See infra Section 3.3.
3 See KOREA FAIR TRADE COMM'N, TONG-GYE-YON-BO [ANNUAL
STATISTICS], Mar. 26, 1999 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.ftc.go.kr>.
See infra Section 4.2 for examples of recent unfriendly takeover attempts. The
number of mergers filed with the Korea Fair Trade Commission that involved
companies with total assets or sales greater than 100 billion won (U.S. $83 mil-
lion) were as follows:
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Merger 62 55 48 48 63 75 151 45
Filings
' Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand are some other countries that are pur-
suing reform in their corporate governance regulations. See ANDREW STONE
ET AL., THE BusINESS ENVIRONMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
STRENGTHENING INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR PERFORMANCE, 6-7
(1998) (visited Apr. 16, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/
privatesector/cg/docs/busenvp8.pdf> (one of five papers prepared by World
Bank staff for their 1998 annual meeting); cf John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as
History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its
Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1999); Roberta Romano,A Cautionary
Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021
(1993).
' But see Ki-won Choi, Sang-bup-gae-jung-an-ui moon-jae.jum [The Problems
with the Proposal to Amend the Commercial Code], L. TIMES (Seoul), June 13,
1994, at 14 (suggesting that the Commercial Code was being revised too fre-
quently). The fast time the corporate law section of the KCC was substan-
tively amended occurred in 1984. See Law No. 3724 of 1984. See generally Gil-
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of issues including shareholder rights, the regulation of mergers
and acquisitions, and the role of directors and auditors. Many of
these changes had been long advocated, but were often delayed
under the pretext that corporations were not ready.6 Before the
impact of the 1995 KCC could fully be measured, however, Ko-
rea's economy plunged into one of the worst recessions in its his-
tory, falling victim to the financial contagion that swept across
most of Asia in 1997.
The 1997 financial crisis exposed a wide range of structural
weaknesses in Korea's economy. International organizations such
as the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("World
Bank"), in particular, criticized Korea's corporate sector and
blamed ineffective corporate regulation as a major cause of the
crisis.8 In addition to corporate sector reforms, such as corporate
jun Park, Gae-jung-sang-bup-hae-sul [Explanation of the Amended Commercial
Code], Jeung-gwon, Mar. 1984, at 37 (providing background on the 1984
amendments to the KCC).
6 See Hee-chul Chung, Sang-bup-gae-jung-si-an-ui moon-jae-jum [Problems
with the Proposed Amendments to the Commercial Code], 23 BUP-HAK [hereinaf-
ter SEOUL L.J.] 1 (1982) [hereinafter Hee-chul Chung, Problems]; Hee-chul
Chung, Sang-bup-gae-jung-an-ui gae-yo-wa moon-jae-jum [Summary of, and Prob-
lems with, the ProposedAmendments to the Commercial Code] 24 SEOUL LJ. 24
(1982) [hereinafter Hee-chul Chung, Summary]; Ju-chan Sonn, Han-gook-sang-
bup-gae.jung-ui hwoe-go [Reflections on Amendments to Korea's Commercial
Code], 10 SANG-SA-BuP-YON-GOO [hereinafter COM. L. REV.] 25 (1992) [here-
inafter Ju-chan Sonn, Reflections]; Ju-chan Sonn, Sang-bup-gae-jung-an-ui moon-
jae-jum' ui moon-jae-jum [The Problems with 'The Problers with the Proposed
Amendments to the Commercial Code'], L.TIMES (Seoul), June 23, 1994, at 15.
' See generally TOMAS J.T. BALIlRO & ANGEL UBIDE, THE KOREAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1997- A STRATEGY OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM
(International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. WP/99/28, 1999) (provid-
ing a comprehensive view on the origns of the crisis and how it affected Ko-
rea); Nouriel Roubini, What Caused Asia's Economic and Currency Crisis and Its
Global Contagion? (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.stern.nyu.edu
/ - nroubini/asia/AsiaHomepage.html> (displaying links and articles on
causes of Asian financial crisis).
8 See BALIuo & UBIDE, supra note 7, at 7 ("[L]ack of transparency in fi-
nancial and corporate sectors, weak governance, and poor regulatory systems
hampered the efficient functioning of markets in disciplining the Korean econ-
omy."). In its "Letter of Development Policy" concerning the Second Struc-
tural Adjustment Loan from the World Bank, the Korean government admit-
ted that "[t]o restore, and sustain, financial viability and competitiveness,
Korean firms need both financial and real restructuring. The latter requires
improvements in the governance of firms and increased exposure to competi-
tive pressures." Letter from Kyu-Sung Lee, Minister of Finance and Economy,
to James D. Wolfensohn, President, International Bank for Reconstruction and
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financial restructuring and corporate governance, the World Bank
and IMF also cited structural problems related to macroeconomic
reforms, financial sector reforms, and labor reforms.9 In return
for receiving their financial assistance, Korea enacted another
round of extensive amendments to its corporate laws on Decem-
ber 28, 1998 ("1998 KCC"). While the 1998 KCC arose out of
unfortunate circumstances, the financial crisis provided the impe-
tus to further overhaul the KCC and implement reforms that re-
mained unfinished after the 1995 amendments. Finally, on De-
cember 31, 1999, several additional amendments were enacted
(" 1999 KCC"). Although not as extensive, the 1999 KCC in par-
ticular included new provisions governing stock options and audit
committees.
This background provides an appropriate juncture at which to
assess the impact and potential of the 1995, 1998, and 1999
amendments to the KCC. This Article will begin with a discus-
sion of the major problems that previously existed in corporate
regulation. It will seek to show that these shortcomings not only
left Korean corporations uncompetitive, but also vulnerable to
external shocks. Next, the Article will review, in depth, the ma-
jor amendments that were recently made to the KCC." The up-
Development, para. 7 (Sept. 24, 1998), <http://www.worldbank.org/html/
extdr/offrep/eap/krsalii/ldp.htmIl > [hereinafter Letter from Kyu-Sung Lee].
" See BALIlO & UBIDE, supra note 7; Letter from Kyu-Sung Lee, supra
note 8.
10 See Letter from Kyu-Sung Lee, supra note 8; Letter from Kyung-Shik
Lee, Governor, Bank of Korea, and Chang-Yeul Lim, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Finance and Economy, to Michel Camdessus, Managing Direc-
tor, International Monetary Fund (Feb. 7, 1998) (visited Feb. 21, 2000)
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/020798.htm>; World Bank, Korea
Second Structural Adjustment Loan Corporate Sector Reform Matrix, Part B: Cor-
porate Governance, Competition Policies, and Reform and Privatization of State-
Owned Enterprises (visited Mar. 6, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/
extdr/offrep/eap/krsalii/matcorps.html>; see also Steven Mufson, Rebuilding
South Korea's House of Cards; Conglomerates Totter Under Costs, Corruption,
WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1997, at Al; Alan Murray,Asia's Turmoil Accents Wall
Street's Strengths, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1997, at 6.
" The KCC provides for four types of companies: hap-ja-hwoe.sa (limited
partnerships), hap-myung-hwoe-sa (general partnerships), yoo-han-hwoe-sa (lim-
ited liability companies), and joo-shik-hwoe-sa (stock corp orations). See KCC
art. 170. This Article will focus on the changes to stock corporations, which
account for more than 92% of all companies in Korea. See CHUL-SONG LEE,
SANG-BUP-GANG-UI [LECTURES ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE] 251 (1997). See




2000] KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE AMENDMENTS 277
shot of these new laws will then be examined through several re-
cent case studies. Lastly, some of the major unresolved issues will
be explored.
Overall, this Article will conclude that the recent changes to
the KCC are reshaping the Korean corporate environment in an
unprecedented fashion. For the first time, firms must establish
more effective checks and balances, and become more transparent
and accountable. While some reforms still languish, these changes
have set into motion a reorientation of the governance structure
of Korean corporations. The recent measures, as a whole, will
help enhance the competitiveness of corporate Korea and allow it
to become a more serious contender in the international market-
place.
2. TH1- SHORTCOMINGS OF CORPORATE KOREA
Not many countries can claim the type of post-war economic
success that Korea has achieved. By the end of 1996, Korea be-
came the eleventh largest economy, with a per capita income of
over U.S. $10,000 in the span of three decades. When the 1997
financial crisis hit, however, the economy and corporate Korea
alike collapsed, unable to withstand the shocks of the crisis. Ko-
rean corporations, therefore, stand at a critical crossroad because
they must find a way to resolve the inherent weaknesses that
were exposed during the crisis.
Most of the faults in Korean corporations can be traced to the
failure of the corporate regulatory framework. In essence, the
management structure established to oversee business firms did
not function as expected. 2 Corporate actors, such as sharehold-
ers, the board of directors, representative directors, and auditors,
2 in addition to internal corporate governance, Korean companies also
suffered from weak external governance. An active mergers and acquisitions
market did not exist, bankruptcies were difficult to pursue, external accounting
oversight was rare, and banks failed to properly control lending practices. See
Seung-min Yoo, Dae-gi-up gyung.young-goo-jo-ui moon-jae-jum-gwa gae-sun-bang-
an [Problems of, and a Proposal to Improve, the Management Structure of Large
Corporations], 36 SANG-JANG-HYUP 11, 18 (1997) (discussing the lack of moni-
toring by creditors). See generally Michael Schuman, Piling On: For Korea's
Banks, Hanbo Is Merely the Latest Shock, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1997, at 1
[hereinafter Schuman, Piling On]; South Korean Bankruptcy: Death, Where Is
Thy Sting?, ECONOMIST, July 17, 1999, at 61 (discussing South Korea's weak
bankruptcy laws).
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did not fulfill their respective statutory duties.13 One expert de-
scribes the anomalous situation whereby Korean boards would
monitor themselves as being functionally in between the dual-
board system or two-tier system of Germany, and the single-
board or one-tier system of the United States. 4 Shareholders,
whether they were individual or institutional investors, did not
monitor corporate affairs. Directors and auditors, in turn, had
little incentive to act as responsible fiduciaries on behalf of the in-
terests of all shareholders.
Over time, an ineffective system of corporate governance
emerged that was saddled with opaque business practices and an
overall lack of checks and balances." Under this lax management
structure, principal shareholders have dominated the affairs of the
corporation, serving as both chief owner and manager. Eventu-
ally, this unchallenged rule by corporate chieftains created enor-
mous agency costs and left Korean corporations structurally vul-
nerable and uncompetitive.
13 The board of directors system was adopted from the Japanese system,
which, in turn, was based on the U.S. system. See Dong-yoon Chung, Sang-bup
sa-ship-oh-nyun: ge hwoe-go wa jun-mang [45 Years of the Korean Commercial
Code: Its Past and Future], in HAN-GOOK BUP-HAK UI HWOE-GO WA JUN-
MANG [THE PAST AND FUTURE OF KoREAN LAW] 343, 356 (1991); see also
Thomas L. Blakemore & Makoto Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revi-
sions: Concerning Corporations, 2 AM. J. COMp. L. 12, 12, 15-16 (1953) ("On a
Commercial Code of continental origin, there have been forcibly grafted cer-
tain limbs of alien, Anglo-American origin."); Lester N. Salwin, The New
Commercial Code of Japan: Symbol of Gradual Progress Toward Democratic
Goals, 50 GEO. L.J. 478, 504 (1962) (detailing the duties of board officers under
the new commercial code).
"4 See Chan-hyung Chung, Gi-up-gyung-young-ui too-myung-sung-jae-go-reul
wui-han joo-Shik-hwoe-sa-ui ji-bae-goo-jo-ui ae-sun I) [Improving Corporate Gov-
ernance of Stock Corporations to Enhace Transparency of Corporate Management
(I)], L. TIMEs (Seoul), May 7, 1998, at 14.
15 See Dae-hong Chang, Joo-joo-joong-shi gyong-young-gwa gi-up.ji.bae-goo.jo
gae-sun [Management that Paces Importance on Shareholder and Improving Cor-
porate Governance], 39 SANG-JANG-HYUP 36 (1999); Soo-geun Oh, Bi-ji.bae.joo-
joo-ui gwon-li-bo-ho-wa gyung-yong-too-myung-sung-ui jae-go [Protecting the Rights
ofNonprincipal Shareholders and Enhancing Managerial Transparency], 37 SANG-
JANG-HYUP 69, 73-81 (1998).
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2.1. Dominant Principal Shareholders and Ineffective Boards of
Directors, Representative Directors, andAuditors
For most publicly held companies in Korea, principal share-
holders unilaterally dictated corporate policy. 6 These principal
shareholders dominated corporate affairs without any checks or
balances in place regarding their decisions, unaccountable to any-
one but themselves." In essence, they naturally placed their in-
terests above the interests of the other shareholders because no
pressure existed to act otherwise, creating an enormous agency
problem.
Principal shareholders commanded all facets of corporate af-
fairs, including board decisions, the selection of directors or audi-
tors, and shareholders' meetings.18 Principal shareholders single-
handedly appointed directors and auditors. Candidates were se-
lected from company employees, with one of the most important
16 See Jong-ho Na & Young-shin Yoon, Chae-bol gae-hyuk (2) [Reform of the
Chaebol (2)], CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul), Jan. 3, 1998, at 11. A classic example oc-
curred in 1994 when the Chairman of the Dong Ah group unilaterally an-
nounced, without considering shareholder interests, that his construction
company accepted moral responsibility for a collapsed bridge and would do-
nate 150 billion won (U.S. $125 million) to the city of Seoul to rebuild it. See
Hyo-sang Kang, Dae-gi-up oh-nub 'dok-joo' man-ta [Many Owners of Large Con-
glomerates Act "Unilaterallyl, CHOSUN ILBO, May 10, 1996, at 11; Young-am
Park & Ik-won Lee, So-soo-joo-joo 'nae-mok-da-oh [Minority Stockholders, "Give
Us Our Share", BUSINESS (Seoul), Apr. 29, 1997, at 66.
17 See Keo-san Lee & Young-shin Yoon, Chae-bol gae-hyuk (7) [Reform of the
Chaebol (7)], CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 8, 1998, at 9; Ui-joon Park, Gi-up mung-deul-
gae-ha-myun ge-man-keum go-tong-joon-da [Those that Harm Corporations Will
Suffer as Much], JOONGANG ILBO, Nov. 27, 1998, at 4; Seung-min Yoo, supra
note 12, at 18-19.
Outside directors or auditors, on the other hand, did not exist until re-
cently. The Korea Stock Exchange ("KSE") required listed companies to elect
one outside director in 1998 and to have outside directors comprise 25% of the
board in 1999. See KSE, Securities Listing Regulations, art. 48-5 (as amended
Feb. 14, 1998). Previously, only certain public enterprises and financial institu-
tions were required to have outside directors. See Public Enterprise Manage-
ment Structure Improvement and Privatization Act, Law No. 5379 of 1997 (as
amended Law No. 5690 of 1999), art. 5 Public Enterprise Management Struc-
ture Improvement and Privatization Act, Law No. 5379 of 1997 (as amended
Law No. 5690 of 1999), art. 5; Presidential Implementing Decree, Decree No.
11395 of 1984 (as amended Decree No. 15513 of 1997), art. 12; Government
Invested Institutions Management Act, Law No. 3690 of 1983 as amended Law
No. 5376 of 1997), art. 11. For a more in depth discussion of the adoption of
the outside directors system in Korea, see Bok-ki Hong, Sa-woe-i-sa-jae-do-ui
jung-chak-gwa ge hwal-sung-hwa [The Establishment and Promotion of an Outside
Director System], 37 SANC-JANG-HYUP 7 (1998).
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criteria being personal loyalty to the principal shareholders.19
Those nominated for director and auditor positions were then
universally approved at shareholders' meetings.
As a result, directors and auditors, thus held captive, could not
act independently from principal shareholders in carrying out
their respective functions. The board of directors did not make
decisions on behalf of the corporation, but instead gave strong
preference to the inclinations or passions of the principal share-
holders." The failure of directors to perform their duties in an
objective and fiducial manner had especially acute consequences
under the Korean legal system, as directors in Korean corpora-
tions have a heightened responsibility due to their double func-
tion as officers. 1 Auditors thus also failed to act as internal
watchdogs monitoring the managerial decisions made by the
board.' Corporate decisions reflected the will of the principal
shareholders. In the end, all of the central internal controls that
were established under the KCC to monitor and manage corpo-
rate decision-making failed to operate.
19 See Hyo-sang Kang, supra note 16.
20 See Hyo-sang Kang et al., Gyung-young min-joo-hwa-ui gil (4): I.sa-hwoe.
neun "Yes'-man-ha-neun guh-soo-gi [The Road to Management Democracy (4):
Board of Directors Are a Rubber Stamp that Only Says "Yesi], CHOSUN ILBO,
May 14, 1996; Byung-tae Lee, Isa-hwoe woon-yong-ui hwal-sung-hwa bang-an [A
Proposal to Revive the Operation of the Board ofDirectors], 37 SANG-JANG-HYUP
139-141 (1998).
21 See Hee-chul Chung, Summary, supra note 6, at 49, 58; Yoo-suk Hong,
Sa-woe-i-sa-jae-ui do-ip-bo-da-neun up-moo-dam-dang-i-sa-Jae-ui pyae-Ji.reul [Abol.
ishing the Operation Director System Instead ofAdopting an Outside Directors Sys-
tem], L. TIMES (Seoul), Apr. 9, 1998, at 6; Byung-tae Lee, supra note 20, at 139-
41; Jong-ho Na & Young-shin Yoon, Chae-bol gae-hyuk (4) [Reform of the Chae-
bol(4)], CHOSUNILBO, Jan. 5, 1998, at 11.
2 See KCC art. 412; see also Dong-yoon Chung, supra note 13, at 358;
Byung-tae Lee, supra note 20, at 146. Outside accounting audits, which are
mandatory for listed companies, were ineffective because accountants were
rarely held accountable. The Korean Supreme Court's 1997 decision that up-
held a finding that Chongun Company, a major accounting firm, was liable f6r
its improper accounting was considered one of the first of its kind. See Judg-
ment of Sept. 12, 1997, Dae-bup-won [Supreme Court], 96 Da 41991; Hup
Choi, Go-min-ha-neun hwoe-ge-bup-in [Worried Accounting Firms], CHOSUN
ILBO, Sept. 21, 1997. Another egregious example of improper accounting in-
volved the collapse of Kia Motors, when it was discovered that over three tril-
lion won [U.S. $2.5 billion] was not accounted for in their financial records.
See Jung-jae Lee, 'Bbung-twi-gi' gwan-haeng-i hwoe-gae boo-shil ki-wuh ["Balloon-
ing"Practice Bred Improper Accounting], JOONGANG ILBO, Aug. 18, 1998.
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2.2. Marginalized Nonprincipal Shareholders
Nonprincipal shareholders, on the other hand, played a mar-
ginal role in corporate affairs. Not only did they lack influence,
but they also generally remained passive actors. First, a barrage
of regulatory obstacles thwarted nonprincipal shareholders from
more active participation in corporate policy. Most of the mini-
mum holding requirements for exercising various shareholder
rights were set at the prohibitively high level of five percent of
the total issued stock, which effectively froze out many share-
holders from participating in corporate affairs.'
With listed companies averaging 62.3 billion won (U.S. $52
million) in capital stock in 1997, a five percent holding require-
ment, for instance, meant that interested stockholders would have
to amass over 3.1 billion won (U.S. $2.6 million) in shares to ex-
ercise their shareholder rights.24 This threshold requirement,
therefore, served as an insurmountable obstacle for most small in-
vestors. Shareholder rights were seldom, if ever, exercised.25 One
indicator of the difficulties shareholders experienced in taking ac-
tion is that, until recently, meaningful shareholder litigation
never existed in Korea.26 Institutional investors, on the other
hand, who could have played a pivotal role, could not participate
in corporate affairs because they were limited to shadow voting
for customer accounts.27
One of the main reasons why policy makers kept the mini-
mum holding requirements so high was because they wished to
2 See Chul-song Lee, So-soo-joo-joo-gwon-ui shil-hyo-sung gum-to [Review of
the Effectiveness of Minority Shareholder Rights], 35 SANG-JANG-HYUP 7 (1997).
24 See KOREA LISTED CO. ASS'N, SANG-JANG-HWOE-SA-YON-GAM 1998
[LISTED COMPANIES ALMANAC 1998], 1998, at 53. All foreign exchange calcu-
lations in this Article are calculated at U.S. $1 = 1200 won. This calculation
was made on a par value basis; the actual market value would be, of course,
even higher.
' See infra Section 3.3.
26 See Dong-yoon Chung, Too-ja-ja-bo-ho-reul wui-han so-song-jae-do-ae
gwan.han yon-goo [Research Paper on Litigation Procedures to Protect Investors],
35 SAN--JANG-HYUP 27 (1997); Chul-song Lee, supra note 23.
2 See Securities Investment Trust Business Act, supra note 1, arts. 25, 25-2;
Securities Investment Company Act, supra note 1, art. 31; Jae-won Lee, Sang-
jang-hwoe-sa-ae it-suh-suh gi-gwan-too-ja-ja-ui yok-hal [The Role of Institutional In-
vestors in Listed Companies], 17 COM. L. REV. 161, 167-77 (1998) (discussing the
various limitations that institutional investors faced); Seung-il Hong & Jung-jae
Lee, Gi-gwan-too-ja-ga ji-boon-do joo-chong ui-gyul-gwon joo-gi-ro [Institutional
Investors to be Granted Voting Rights],JOONGANG ILBO, Feb. 7, 1998, at 10.
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protect management. 21 Policy makers believed that because man-
agement needed to make swift and decisive judgments, it could
not be burdened by outside pressures such as shareholders. Con-
cerns also existed that if minimum holding requirements were
lowered, they would be abused by bad faith shareholders, and
companies would be immobilized by an onslaught of litigation
from disgruntled shareholders.29 Some also claimed that racket-
eers would acquire shares and threaten to cause trouble at share-
holders' meetings, extorting payoffs in return for their coopera-
tion. The recent increase in directors' liability insurance has been
cited as another negative aspect and added expense of the new
shareholding requirements.3"
Given the Korean context, however, these arguments remain
unpersuasive. First, natural barriers to litigation deter already
nonlitigious Koreans. Litigation is time-consuming, expensive,
and involves public exposure. Furthermore, Korea does not al-
low class action suits. The modified minimum holding thresh-
old still requires a substantial sum of shares. With the average to-
tal market value of Korean listed companies at approximately 228
billion won (U.S. $190 million), one percent of the total shares
would require shareholders with 2.28 billion won (U.S. $1.9 mil-
lion) worth of stock to unite forces.3 2
21 See Chul-song Lee, supra note 23. Management was also granted protec-
tion as a means to promote the newly established financial market because
many companies were reluctant to list their shares on the market out of fear
they would lose control. See Joon Park, Symposium: Capital Market and Finan-
cial Service in the Pacific Rim: Prospect fir Harmonization, 28 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 893 (1997). See generally JUNG-RYUM KIM, HAN-GOOK-GYUNG-
JAE-JUNG-CHEK 30-NYUN-SA [30 YEARS OF KOREAN ECoNOMIc HISTORY]
278-84 (1995) (discussing the history of policies implemented to induce Korean
companies to go public).
29 See generally Korea Center for Free Enterprises (visited Sept. 1, 1999)
<http://www.cfe.org> (discussing more in depth the potential problems of
enhancing shareholder rights in Korea).
30 See Joanna Slater, Running for Cover: Directors Seek Insurance Against
Liability, FAR E. ECON. REv., Feb. 4, 1999, at 47 (discussing the increase to ap-
proximately 100 new policies in 1998 from practically none in 1997).
31 See Dong-yoon Chung, supra note 13 (discussing the need for Korea to
adopt the U.S. class action system or the German Verbandsklage system). A
draft law for class actions in securities-related cases has been presented to the
National Assembly, but has yet to be adopted. See The National Assembly of
the Republic of Korea (visited Nov. 1, 1999) < http://www.assembly.go.kr >.
32 See KSE, 368 Joo-shik [Stock] 12, Apr. 1999.
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Unlike Japan, the activity of racketeers has been marginal at
best.33 Despite the recently lowered Securities Exchange Act
("SEA") threshold, there have been only a few reported share-
holder derivative suits, all of which have occurred since 1997.34
The concerns about extortionist litigation have not materialized,
and if any concerns still exist regarding extortion-oriented or bad
faith litigation, many observers have pointed out that the courts
can prevent such actions from taking place.35
When one weighs the consequences of an overprotective and
unbridled management that lacks accountability versus the alleged
need for speedy and decisive decision making, it appears that the
government's overall policy intentions over the years have out-
lived their initial purpose.
Korean shareholders were also generally not interested in par-
ticipating in corporate governance. Most shareholders, in fact,
did not even realize that they had rights. 36 The primary focus for
Korean shareholders was short-term gains rather than long-term
investment. 37 This short-term investment strategy consequently
led to little loyalty or interest in the affairs of corporate manage-
ment.
3 8
Nonprincipal shareholders, therefore, lacked the ability and
interest to participate in corporate affairs. As testimony to the
marginal role of shareholders, shareholders' meetings became
symbolic events held according to predetermined scripts that
" See Edward Lincoln, Behind the Chrysanthemum Curtain, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Nov. 19, 1997, at 12; Question Time in Japan, ECONOMIST, May 1, 1999,
at 61.
' Korea First Bank, Korea Telecom, and Samsung Electronics are the only
recent examples. See infra Sections 4.3, 4.4; notes 180, 248; Chul-song Lee,su-
pra note 23, at 7 ("[T]he Commercial Code provision governing derivative ac-
tions for practical purposes has been dead paper.").
31 See Ki-won Choi, IMF ui geuk-bok-eul wui-han sang-bup-gae-jung bang.
hyang I) [How the Korean Commercial Code Should Be Amened to Overcome
the IMF Situation (I)], L. TIMES (Seoul), Apr. 16, 1998, at 14; Gyo-chang Kim,
Sang-bup-jung hwoe-sa-pyun-ui gae-jung-ui-gyun [An Opinion on Amending the
Stock Corporation Section of the Commercial Code], L. TIMES (Seoul), Mar. 12,
1998, at 14.
36 See Scourge of the Chaebol, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1999, at 68.
37 For instance, the average length of ownership for individual investors
was 1.2 months between January and July of 1999, 1.9 months in 1998, and 4.1
months in 1997. See KSE Press Release, Aug. 21, 1999 (on file with author).
38 See infra Section 3.8 for further discussion on how the low dividend pol-
icy played an important role in the short-term investment strategy of most Ko-
rean shareholders.
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merely rubber-stamped major board decisions.39 In fact, the over-
all lack of protection for the interests of nonprincipal sharehold-
ers was considered to be one of the major barriers to foreign in-
vestment.40
2.3. The Vulnerability of the Korean Corporate Paradigm:
The Case of the Chaebols
The results of this lapse in corporate regulation is best illus-
trated by the cbaebol, or family-owned conglomerates, that main-
tain an overwhelming position in the Korean economy.4' First, as
principal shareholders, the chieftains of Korea's cbaebol conglom-
erates took full advantage of the lack of internal controls and
checks and balances in Korean corporations. They dominated en-
tire conglomerates and controlled dozens of subsidiaries and re-
lated companies while avoiding any accountability.
42
These principal shareholders of the cbaebol conglomerates
usually held positions as "Chairmen," yet they would officially
register themselves as directors in only the major corporations
" On the ineffectual nature of Korean shareholders' meetings, seeROGER
L. JANELLI & DAWNHEE YIM, MAKING CAPITALISM: THE SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF A SOUTH KOREAN CONGLOMERATE (Stan-
ford Univ. Press 1993); Chan-hyung Chung, supra note 14; Scourge of the Chae.
bol, supra note 36 ("Time was that shareholders' meetings in South Korea were
about as rowdy as a party congress in the communist North; often the entire
agenda was wrapped up in only a few minutes.").
40 See Soo-geun Oh, supra note 15.
41 See Mufson, supra note 10. The financial sector, which saw the collapse
of such firms as Koryo Securities, Dongsuh Securities, Daedong Bank, Dong-
nam Bank, Kyunggi Bank, Chungchung Bank, Korea First Bank, and Seoul
Bank, also serves as a prime example of the failed Korean corporate paradigm.
See Schuman, Piling On, supra note 12; Michael Schuman, Tangled Web: Hanbo
Steel Default Shows Shift in Government Policy, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 27,
1997, at 1 [hereinafter Schuman, Tangled Web]. See generally Ungki Lim, Pat.
terns of Ownership Structure and Their Characteristics in Korean Conglomerates:
With Cases af the 30 Largest Chaebols (on file with author) (offering a compre-
hensive study of the ownership structure of the top 30 chaebols).
42 See Chan-hyung Chung, supra note 14; Seung-wook Chung, Joo-shik-
hwoe-sa ji-bae-joo-joo-ui bup-juk chaet-im-ae gwan-han yon.goo [A Study on the Le.
gal Liabilities of the Principal Shareholders in Corporations] (1998) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Seoul National University) (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Seung-wook Chung, Shareholders]; Seung-wook Chung, Dae-gi-up-ae it-suh-
sub sa-shil-sang i-sa-ui cbaek-im.gwa ge-han.gye [The Responsibilities and Limita-
tions of De Facto Directors in Large Corporations], 38 SANG-JANG-HYUP 91
(1998) [hereinafter Seung-wook Chung, Directors].
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within the conglomerate.43 This overall structure allowed chief-
tains to minimize their legal responsibility." Chairmen, further-
more, reigned over conglomerates with only a marginal portion
of the outstanding shares, often amounting to less than three per-
cent.4" Companies within a conglomerate were instead held to-
gether through an interlocking web of cross shareholding owner-
.46avieship between related and sister companies. They avoided
assuming legally binding positions and limited their personal in-
vestment risk while, at the same time, being the principal of the
conglomerate.
Chairmen dominated directors and auditors. Nonprincipal
shareholders, in turn, did not provide any monitoring pressure.
Unlike the corporate governance systems in Japan or continental
Europe, financial intermediaries failed to offer any supervisory
discipline.4 ' The chance of being held accountable became re-
mote, and investment risk exposure was minimal. Chaebol
chairmen naturally gravitated to a business strategy that empha-
sized diversification, size, and market share over profitability and
shareholder value.48 From this perspective, the interests of the en-
4' None of the leading cbaebols has been ever controlled by a woman.
4 See Seung-wook Chung, Directors, supra note 42.
4s See KSE Press Release, Sept. 16, 1999 (on file with author). See generally
Hee-kab Kang, Woo-ri-na.ra-ui Gi-up-ji-bae-goo.jo-ui ip-bup-ron.juk gum-to [Re-
view of the Legislative Theory Behind Korea's Corporate Governance] 39 SANG-
JANG-HYUP 20, 28 (1999). To curb their influence, one observer has suggested
limiting the voting rights of these principal shareholders. See Hee-chul Chung,
Problems, supra note 6, at 12-13.
41 In the case of the 10 largest chaebols, the principal stake of chaebol
chairmen has in fact increased from 26.63% to 34.6% as a result of cross owner-
ship and other family interests since the 1997 financial crisis. See KSE Press Re-
lease, supra note 45; Samuel Lee, Korean Conglomerates Remain Entrenched,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1999. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in
Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145, 1162-63 (1998).
'7 See Coffee, supra note 4.
48 This overall corporate ownership structure can be traced to Korea's in-
dustrial policy. In an effort to industrialize the economy through chaebol cm-
glomerates, Korean policymakers believed that Korean corporations should be
protected. See Namju Cho, Korea Takes New Step to Spur Mergers, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Mar. 20, 1997, at 1 (calling Korean corporations "often-coddled") [here-
inafter Namju Cho, Korea Takes New Step]. But see The Apologist: The World
Blames South Korea's Huge Conglomerates for the Country's Economic Melt-
down-Bae le-Dong Has the Thankless Task of Defending 7hem, ECONOMIST,
Aug. 29, 1998, at 62 (profiling an economist for thechaebol s lobbying associa-
tion who argues that the chaebol's excessive borrowing and emphasis on market
share were necessary) [hereinafter The Apologist].
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tire chaebol conglomerate were placed above the well-being of in-
dividual corporations and their respective shareholders. Divi-
dends, for instance, were kept to a minimum.
In the initial stages, the chaebol model arguably held some ad-
vantages, such as efficient and speedy decision-making. 9 Yet any
management system that operates without adequate supervision
or monitoring cannot remain internationally competitive. The
longer such a system persists and the larger a company becomes,
the greater will be the agency costs and the subsequent decline in
efficiency. The chaebol's corporate structure exemplified these
characteristics.
One person dominated all the companies in an entire con-
glomerate without any effective checks or balances or account-
ability. This management structure eventually became plagued
with inefficiencies and irregularities. Chaebols often became non-
specialized, bloated behemoths that were largely sustained by
debt."0 At their worst, the conglomerate culture became condu-
cive to illicit activities adverse to the interests of individual corpo-
rations and their respective shareholders. Funds from profitable
companies were shifted to support new and weaker companies
through transfer pricing and cross guarantees." More egregious
examples included the expropriation of company funds, the crea-
tion of slush funds, and self-dealing by the principal sharehold-
ers." To conceal these practices from shareholders and regula-
"4 See Seung-min Yoo, supra note 12, at 13-15 (providing a comparison of
the various asserted strengths and weaknesses of the chaebol's concentrated
management style).
51 See The Apologist, supra note 48 (discussing how the chaebols started go-
ing bankrupt as they became unable to pay interest charges on skyrocketing
debts out of cash flow). The defunct Hanbo Steel was one of the most over-
leveraged companies in Korea before it collapsed, having amassed five trillion
won in debt, over 22 times its equity. See Schuman, Tangled Web, supra note
41.
51 See infra Section 4.4.
52 See Mufson, supra note 10; Seung-min Yoo, supra note 12, at 17-18. In-
dicative of the state of mind of many chaebol owners, when charged with mis-
appropriating customer funds, the former chairman of the defunct Kuhpyong
Group replied at a National Assembly Audit Committee hearing, "I didn't
know that you were not supposed to misappropriate customers' funds .... I
didn't know which funds were the customers' and which were the com-
pany's." See Hee-chun Cho, Go.gaek-don yoo-yong bool-bup-in-jool mol-lat-
dla/Na seung-yul hwoe-jang gook-gam bal-uhn [Didn't Know It Was illegal to Mis-
appropriate Customer's Funds: Chairman Na Seung-yul Statement at National
Audit Hearing], CHOSUN ILBO, Nov. 4, 1998, at 33.
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tors, opaqueness instead of transparency became the standard
practice of choice. 3 As chaebols became uncompetitive and vul-
nerable to outside shocks, the system began to unravel gradually,
outliving most of the merits it once had.
The failure of corporate regulation, therefore, ultimately con-
tributed to the spectacular failures of such mainstay conglomer-
ates as Daewoo, Hanbo, Kia, and Daenong. 4 Given the domi-
nant position of the chaebol, their failures had multiple
repercussions throughout the Korean economy and helped pre-
cipitate the severity of the 1997 financial crisis.
3. THm NEW KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE
To correct these various structural problems, the KCC was
amended three times in the past four years. The 1995 amend-
ments came after more than ten years of review and became effec-
tive on October 1, 1996. The preamble of the 1995 KCC pro-
vides that one of the primary purposes of the revisions was to
"enhance the international competitiveness of Korean compa-
nies."5 The major focus of the 1998 amendments was to address
the failures that were exposed during the financial crisis. 6 The
1998 amendments included provisions to simplify the mergers
and acquisitions process, increase the accountability of de facto
directors, and strengthen minority shareholder rights. The 1999
amendments, however, included regulations concerning stock op-
tions and audit committees. The various amendments that oc-
curred in 1995, 1998, and 1999 will be reviewed by subject matter,
with an emphasis on changes affecting corporate governance.
s See Soo-geun Oh, supra note 15, at 73-74.
Among the top 30 major chaebol conglomerates, 11 have been taken
over, have filed for bankruptcy, or are undergoing workout proceedings. The
failed cbaebols, along with their old rankings in parentheses, include Daewoo
(2nd), Kia (8th), Halla (12th), Hanbo (14th), Jinro (19th), New Core (25th),
Sammi (26th), and Dainong (34th). See Dong-han Lee, Sbil-pae yon-gu: 2 sae
chong-soo dok-dan-ae in-uijang-mak' kka-ji [Study of Failure: From the Autocracy
of Second Generation Chieftains to Being Sheltered by 'Curtains of People],
CHOSUN ILBO, Apr. 19, 1999, at 13.
5 1995 KCC preamble.
56 See 1998 KCC preamble.
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3.1. Directors
One of the main objectives of revising the KCC was to make
directors more accountable. Under the previous legal regime, di-
rectors had an obligation to their company based on a general
standard called the "duty of diligence as a good custodian (sun-
lyang-han-gwan-li-ja-ui-ju-ui-ui-mu)," which was similar to a com-
bination of the duty of good faith and fair dealing."7 This general
standard was not based on a provision in the Commercial Code,
but applied to corporate directors indirectly through reference to
Article 681 of the Civil Code. 8 Directors, in turn, neglected their
roles as good custodians or fiduciaries.5 9 To heighten awareness
of the fundamental responsibility that directors owe to their cor-
porations, an explicit fiduciary duty has now been imposed upon
directors. 6' Under this provision, directors must fulfill their obli-
gations in a fiduciary manner on behalf of the company as pro-
vided by the law, as well as by the articles of incorporation.61
Secondly, the new KCC requires directors to act more vigi-
lantly in protecting the interests of their company. Directors
now have a duty to immediately report to the company's statu-
tory auditor any facts they learn that may "significantly injure"
the company.62 This provision affirmatively forces directors to be
more attentive in protecting the interests of shareholders. The
potential effectiveness of this new duty, however, will depend on
how the courts interpret the term "significant injury." (Similarly,
the board of directors' minutes must now include the names of
any directors that objected to any decisions, and the reasons why
they objected. 63 Not only did directors rarely object to board de-
cisions, but board minutes rarely provided any detailed informa-
"' Ki-won Choi, supra note 1. Some believe that, other than symbolically,
the fiduciary duty and the general due diligence standards are not significantl
distinguishable, and propose instead that Korea follow the German model,
placing the burden ofproof on directors to properly carry out their duties. See
id.
" See KCC art. 1 (providing that the Civil Code applies when a matter is
not covered by the KCC).
"' See infra Section 4 for various examples.
60 See 1998 KCC art. 382-3.
61 See id.
62 1995 KCC art. 412-2.
61 See 1999 KCC art. 391-3. Creditors can no longer inspect board min-
utes. See id. art. 396.
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tion concerning any objections in the past. At the same time,
companies may now reject a shareholder's inspection request if
they provide a "reason."" If rejected, the shareholder must obtain
court approval for an inspection, placing the burden on the
shareholder, rather than the company.)
Thirdly, another significant amendment to the KCC is that
principal shareholders now may be considered to have the same
responsibilities and liabilities as directors under certain circum-
stances. Under the old regulatory framework, it was extremely
difficult to establish liability against principal shareholders." One
would have to either demonstrate that the principal shareholders
were de facto directors or pierce the corporate veil-both chal-
lenging tasks, given that the party making such an assertion has
the burden of proof.66
The new KCC therefore provides that persons who "use their
influence to direct or participate in the corporate affairs of direc-
tors" can be held jointly and severally liable with the other direc-
tors of a company.' Persons who hold titles such as "honorary
chairman," "chairman," "president," "vice-president," or conduct
corporate affairs under the pretext of such titles, in particular,
will be deemed to be directors even if they are not registered di-
rectors.68 The principal shareholders who have dominated corpo-
rate decision-making can no longer avoid managerial liability
merely by not registering as directors. This new provision makes
it substantially easier to find principal shareholders accountable as
directors. They will be considered the same as other directors
64 See id art. 391-3; art. 396.
65 See Seung-wook Chung, Shareholders, supra note 42.
66 See Seung-wook Chung, Directors, supra note 42, at 96-97; see also Judg-
ment of June 11, 1985, Dae-bup-won [Supreme Court], 84 Daka 963 (finding
that under Article 395, a person does not have to be a registered director to be
considered a de facto representative director that could bind the company).
67 1998 KCC art. 401-2.
68 See id. art. 401-2, para. 1, subpara. 3.
69 Minority shareholders of Korea Telecom recently brought a case against
the government claiming that the government should be responsible under this
provision because it in fact dictated corporate affairs at Korea Telecom. See In-
soon Kim, Han-gook-tong-shin so-aek-joo-joo, jung-boo-ae Joo-oo-dae-pyo-so-song
[Korea Telecom Minority Shareholders Bring a Shareholder Derivative Action
Against the Government], MAEIL Bus. NEWS (Seoul), Apr. 12, 1999.
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with the same duties and responsibilities. As a result, many com-
pany chieftans are finally registering as directors.7'
The new KCC amendments also seek to accommodate the in-
terests of small companies. First, corporations having less than
500 million won (U.S. $418,000) in paid-in capital, for example,
do not have an obligation to elect a minimum of three directors.71
This new provision allows small corporations to avoid the unnec-
essary burden of electing ghost directors who only lend their
name during the process of incorporation but do nothing else, a
common practice in the past.72 If a small corporation elects only
one director, all occasions where the KCC requires approval from
the board of directors will require instead approval from the
shareholders. 3
Finally, to enhance the efficiency of the board of directors,
several changes have been made. The entire board may now dele-
gate certain functions to a subcommittee of directors. Those
functions that cannot be delegated include such matters as the
election or termination of the representative director and the
proposal of issues that require shareholder approval. Further-
more, unless provided otherwise in the articles of incorporation,
directors may now participate in board meetings through simul-
taneous audiovisual electronic transmission.
75
3.2. Auditors andAudit Committees
One of the most dubious positions in a Korean corporation
belongs to that of statutory auditors.76 Auditors were established
7o See Jong-young Kim, Geu.rup-hwoe.jang-jae pye-ji... joo.ryuk.sa gyung.
young jip-joong [Abolishing of the Conglomerate Chairman System... Concentrat-
ing Management ofMain Companies], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Feb. 28, 1998.
71 See 1998 KCC art. 383.
' For a critical view of this amendment, see Ki-won Choi,supra note 35.
73 See 1998 KCC art. 383, para. 4.
14 See 1999 KCC art. 393-2.
71 See id. art. 391.
76 See Chan-hyung Chung, supra note 14, at 14-15; see also Joon-young
Chung, Gi-up-gyung-young-too-myung-sung jae.go.wa gam-sa.jae-do gae.sun [En-
hancing Corporate Management Transparency and Improving the Audit System],
35 SANC-JANG-HYIuP 76 (1997). Auditors are separated into internal auditors
and external auditors. External auditors are limited to accounting audits and
are required for all companies with more than seven billion won (U.S. $5.8
million in total assets under the Law Concerning External Audits of Corpora-
tions, Law No. 3297 of 1980 (as amended Law No. 6108 of 2000). Internal
auditors are governed under the KCC. See KCC arts. 409-415; seealso Young-il
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as internal institutions to monitor corporate affairs and the deci-
sion making of directors on behalf of shareholders,"' yet they
were unable to fulfill their function. The recent amendments
seek to strengthen the authority of auditors so they can effec-
tively act as internal watchdogs, as intended under the Commer-
cial Code. For instance, companies can now establish an audit
committee to replace the functions of the auditor."
First, to enhance their standing, auditors will receive protec-
tion from unjust termination."9 Auditors commonly feared re-
taliatory discharge if they raised any challenges against manage-
ment in the interests of the corporation or its shareholders. To
allay these concerns, auditors now have a guaranteed opportunity
to inform all shareholders of the circumstances of their termina-
tion.
Auditors also have been empowered with the right to convene
a shareholders' meeting."0 In the past, only the board of directors
or shareholders who met a high holding requirement could call a
shareholders' meeting. Auditors, especially outside auditors who
are required for large companies, have gained tremendous author-
ity as a result of this provision."1 They can unilaterally call share-
holders' meetings in order to inform shareholders, take votes on
controversial issues, and confirm board decisions.
Finally, the term of office for auditors has been extended from
two years to three years, in order to match the length of the term
for directors.8" It was believed that longer terms would provide
auditors more job security and more independent authority.
In addition to granting these various protections, the new
KCC limits the qualifications of auditors to guarantee their objec-
tivity. An individual can no longer be both an auditor of a parent
company and a director of a subsidiary company at the same
Yoo, Sang-geun-gam-sa-wa sa-woe-gam-sa-jae-do.ui do-ib-ui-ui-wa woon-yong-hyo-
yul-hwa bang-an [The Importance of Adopting, and Improving the Management
Effectiveness of, Permanent Auditors and the Outside Auditor System], 37 SANG-
JANG-HYUP 42 (1998).
r See KCC art. 412; see also Dong-yoon Chung, supra note 13, at 358.
78 See 1999 KCC art. 415-2.
7 See 1995 KCC art. 409-2.
80 See id. art. 412-3.
81 See infra Section 4.4.
82 See 1995 KCC art. 410. The term of office for auditors was extended
from one year to two years in 1984. See Ju-chan Sonn, Reflections, supra note
6, at 34.
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time." Parent company directors tend to have a strong influence
over the directors of a subsidiary. Absent this position, auditors
of a parent company could have a conflict of interest when audit-
ing decisions made by the parent company's directors concerning
their influence over a subsidiary's directors. If auditors of a par-
ent company were jointly allowed to be directors of a subsidiary,
they would be forced to audit affairs relating to themselves. 4 In
contrast, a person may be an auditor of both a parent and a sub-
sidiary company, or a director of a parent company and an audi-
tor of a subsidiary company without implicating conflict of inter-
est concerns.
If an audit committee is established based on the terms of a
company's articles of incorporation, the committee must consist
of at least three directors."5 In electing audit committee members,
the committee cannot consist of more than one-third of the fol-
lowing categories: (1) an inside director or a person who was an
inside director within the last two years; (2) the largest share-
holder, his or her spouse, or direct lineal relative; (3) a director,
auditor, or employee of the largest corporate shareholder, a par-
ent or subsidiary company, or a major interested company; (4) a
spouse or direct lineal relative of a director; and (5) a director,
auditor or employee of another company for which the director
also acts as a director. Furthermore, audit committee members
can only be terminated by a vote of over two-thirds of the board
of directors. These various requirements were stipulated to en-
sure the independence of the audit committee.
3.3. Strengthening Shareholder Rights
Among the various amendments to the KCC, some of the
most significant changes involved the new measures to strengthen
the neglected rights of shareholders. The 1995 KCC, 1998 KCC,
and 1999 KCC sought to make it easier for shareholders to exer-
cise their existing rights and also sought to establish new rights on
their behalf. These changes led to a seismic shift in the overall
scheme of corporate regulation.
83 See 1995 KCC art. 411; see also Ju-chan Sonn et al., Sang-bup-gae.jung-an-
hae-sul [Explanatory Notes on Proposed Amendments to the Commercial Code]
139 (Bupmoonsa Publishers 1995) [hereinafterExplanatory Notes].
" See Explanatory Notes, supra note 83, at 139.
81 See 1999 KCC art. 415-2.
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Table 1: Recent Amendments to the KCC and SEA86
Shareholder Right KCC SEA
Type 1995 1 199888 1997'9 Feb. May Jan. 2000r2
S199810 199891
Requesting 5% 3% 1% 0.5% N/C 0.25%
termination of (0.5%) (0.25%) (0.125%)
directors &
auditors
Seeking injunctive 5% 1% 1% 0.5% N/C 0.25%
action against (0.5%) (0.25%) (0.125%)
illegal acts
Bringing share- 5% 1% 1% 0.05% 0.01% 0.005%
holder derivative (0.5%)
actions
Convening a spe- 5% 3% 3% N/C N/C 1.5%
cial shareholders' (1.5%) (0.75%)
meeting
Compelling 5% 3% 3% 1% N/C 0.5%
production of (1.5%) (0.5%) (0.25%)
financial records
for inspection
Appointing an 5% 3% 3% N/C N/C 1.5%




Terminating a 5% 3% 3% 0.5% N/C 0.25%
liquidator (1.5%) (0.25%) (0.125%)
Requesting cumula- - 3% - -
tive voting
Making a share- - 3% 1% N/C N/C 0.5%
holder proposal _.5(0.5%) (0.25%)
Requesting 10% 10% ....
dissolution I
86 The numbers in parentheses apply to listed or registered companies with
at least 100 billion won in paid-in capital. SEA applies to shareholders with at
least six months ownership. January 2000 revisions to the SEA only apply to
certain securities companies with at least two trillion won in assets. N/C signi-
fies no change.
87 KCC, as amended by Law No. 5053 of 1995 (effective Oct. 1, 1996).
88 KCC, as amended by Law No. 5591 of 1998 (effective Dec. 28, 1998, ex-
cept for the cumulative voting provision, which became effective on June 28,
1998).
89 SEA, as amended by Law No. 5254 of 1997 (effective Apr. 1, 1997).
o SEA, as amended by Law No. 5521 of 1998 (effective Apr. 1, 1998).
91 SEA, as amended by Law No. 5539 of 1998 (effective May 25, 1998).
92 SEA, as amended by Law No. 6176 of 2000 (effective Apr. 1, 2000).
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First and foremost, although the minimum holding require-
ments for exercising various shareholder rights remain high,93
considerable progress has been achieved in that these require-
ments were significantly lowered. Overall, the new KCC has re-
duced the minimum holding standards required to exercise the
following rights:94 (1) requesting a court to terminate directors
and auditors for improper or illegal acts in contravention of any
law or the articles of incorporation, reduced from five percent to
three percent;" (2) seeking injunctive action against illegal acts in
contravention of any law or the articles of incoToration of a di-
rector, reduced from five percent to one percent;9 (3) bringing
shareholder derivative actions, reduced from five percent to one
percent;7 (4) convening a special shareholders' meeting, reduced
from five percent to three percent; (5) compelling production of
financial records for inspection, reduced from five percent to
three percent;99 (6) requesting a court to appoint an Inspector to
examine corporate affairs, corporate records, and financial status,
reduced from five percent to three percent;" and (7) terminating
a liquidator, reduced from five percent to three percent.0 1
As noted above, it is now easier for shareholders to seek the
termination of a director. In the past, when a director committed
an "improper act," or violated "a law or the articles of incorpora-
tion," shareholder attempts to terminate such a director were of-
ten stymied at the shareholders' meeting due to the dominance of
the principal shareholders. 2 Dissenting shareholders with only
' The holding requirements for shareholders of listed companies were
fast lowered at the end of 1996. See SEA, Law No. 5254 of 1997; supra Table
1.
" This summary of percentages excludes shares that do not have voting
rights, such as most preferred shares. For a summary of litigation-related in-
vestor rights, see Dong-yoon Chung, supra note 26, at 41-42.
1s See 1998 KCC art. 385.
96 See id. art. 402.
17 See id. art. 403.
98 See id. art. 366.
" See id. art. 466. Ki-won Choi argues that since shareholder derivative
suits are in fact impossible without the right to inspect financial records that
these two rights should have the same requirement of one percent. See Ki-won
Choi, supra note 35.
'1 See 1998 KCC art. 467.
101 See id. art. 539.
102 Id. art. 385.
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three percent of the total shares can now request the termination
before a competent court after such a shareholders' meeting. This
provides an important means by which to hold directors more ac-
countable, especially those protected by the dominant share-
holder.
In the case of the shareholder derivative action, the new law
not only lowered the holding requirement, but also added a criti-
cal feature. 3 Under the new law, the one percent holding re-
quirement for bringing a derivative action only has to be met
when the action commences and need not be maintained for the
duration of the case. This change greatly facilitates the ability of
small investors to sustain derivative actions, especially because
most investors in Korea do not hold onto their shares for ex-
tended periods."° Overall, the lower minimum ownership re-
quirements mark an important step in empowering shareholders
to oversee the actions of directors. As a result, the number of
shareholder actions has risen significantly."0 '
In addition to lowering the various holding requirements,
both the 1998 and 1999 amendments established several new
shareholders' rights. First, as provided in the articles of incorpo-
ration, shareholders can now execute their votes in writing with-
out actually attending the shareholders' meeting.0 6 This makes it
substantially easier for shareholders to exercise their rights. Sec-
ond, shareholders can request cumulative voting when electing di-
rectors."0 7 Shareholders with at least three percent of the total
shares can request cumulative voting when more than two direc-
tors are elected. Companies must accept such a request unless
they have added a provision in their articles of incorporation to
exclude it. Amending the articles of incorporation requires a spe-
103 See id. art. 403, para. 5.
104 See KSE Press Release, supra note 37.
105 See infra Section 4.
106 See 1999 KCC art. 366-3.
107 See 1998 KCC art. 382-2. One observer argues that Korea is not ready
for the cumulative voting system because it will create confusion. See Ki-won
Choi, supra note 35. Choi roposes instead a new system of corporate govern-
ance whereby 50% of the "oard would be elected as before, 25% would be
elected with each shareholder's voting rights being limited to a maximum of
3%, and the remaining 25% would be elected by large creditors. See id. For
companies with more than 10,000 workers, a representative from the workers
would be elected. See id.
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cial majority vote at a shareholders' meeting, which may be a
considerable burden.108
One problem with this provision is that, unlike the other
provisions of the 1998 KCC, it did not become effective until
June 28, 1999. Any election of directors preceding that date did
not have to be executed with cumulative voting, and companies
were granted a chance to adopt exclusionary provisions to pro-
hibit it. According to the Korea Stock Exchange, of the 516 listed
companies with fiscal years ending in December 1998, 386 com-
panies, or 74.8%, managed to enact provisions excluding cumula-
tive voting."9 The remaining 130 companies, or 26.2%, and those
companies that have not adopted such exclusionary provisions by
June 1999, will have to adopt cumulative voting.
Another important right created for shareholders is the right
to propose items to be placed on the agenda of a shareholders'
meeting."0 Interested shareholders with at least three percent of
the total issued shares must first submit their proposals to the re-
sponsible director six weeks before the shareholders' meeting.
Shareholders can request that their proposal items be included
along with other material and notices sent to other shareholders.
The board of directors must accept a shareholder proposal thus
108 See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
1 See Yoon-jae Han, 12 wol gyol-san-bup-in 75% ]ib-jung-tu.pyo-jae do-ip an-
ki-ro [75% of Companies with Fiscal Years Ending in December Decide Not to
Adopt Cumulative Voting], CHOSuN ILBO, Mar. 30, 1999; Sung-won Lee, Dae-
duk-san-up deung 22 sa aek-myun bun-hal 12 wol bup-in jung-gwan byun-gyung
[Companies with Accounting Years Ending in December Change Articles of Incor-
poration: Daeduk Industries and 22 Other Comeanies Provide for Stock Splits],
MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Mar. 30, 1999. Citing the situation in Japan, Ki-won Choi
predicted that companies would just pass provisions to exclude the require-
ment or would elect directors on staggered terms. See Ki-won Choi, supra note
35.
10 See 1998 KCC art. 363-2. The first reported case where a company ac-
cepted a shareholder proposal occurred on May 27, 1997, when Korea Interna-
tional Merchant Bank accepted a proposal to elect certain directors. See Sung-il
Hong, So-aek joo-joo jae-an chut gwan-chul [Minority Shareholder Proposal Ac-
cepted for the First Time], JOONGANG ILBO, May 28, 1997. See generally Hong-
ryul Chun, Ju-ju-jae-an-jae-do-wa sang-jang gi-up-ui dae-ung [The Shareholder Pro.
posal and How Listed Companies Should Respond], 38 SANG-JANG-HYUP 69
(1998); Jong-ho Kwon, Gyung-young-]a-gam-shi-soo-dan-eu-ro.suh wui-im.]ang.
gwon-yu-ui hyo-yul-sung [Effectiveness oJ Proxy Solicitation as a Means of Monitor.
ing Management], 17 COM. L. REV. 111 (1998). Shareholder proposals were
adopted for listed companies at the end of 1996. See SEA, supra note 93.
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submitted unless it contravenes a law or the articles of incorpora-
tion."'
Those who make a shareholder proposal may then request an
opportunity to explain their proposal at the shareholders' meet-
ing."' Companies that fail to comply with the shareholder pro-
posal provision may be subject to a fine of up to five million won
(U.S. $41,800)."' This vital provision grants shareholders the op-
portunity to voice their opinions on issues of concern to them,
instead of merely being limited to the agenda set by the company.
This provision is flawed, however, because it is not consistent
with the procedures by which to convene a shareholders' meet-
ing. A company only has to give shareholders two weeks' notice
before convening a shareholders' meeting."' Hence, if sharehold-
ers receive only the minimal two weeks' notice, they will not
have sufficient time to submit a shareholder proposal, which re-
quires six weeks' advance notice. This means that the shareholder
proposal provision can only be used if the shareholders them-
selves request a special shareholders' meeting. Otherwise, for
shareholders' meetings convened by the board of directors, share-
holders can only guess when the actual meetings will be held and
submit shareholder proposals six weeks in advance of that esti-
mated date. One company has already used this loophole, re-
scheduling a shareholders' meeting to avoid including a share-
holder proposal made by several foreign funds.'
3.4. Mergers
Another important reason for amending the KCC was to
overhaul the regulations concerning mergers. As testimony to
the significance of mergers, the merger provisions, originally part
of "Section 10 Dissolutions" under the old KCC, were moved to
a newly created section specifically entitled "Section 10 Mergers"
in the 1998 KCC. From one perspective, a more active mergers
and acquisitions market was viewed as a means of strengthening
... See 1998 KCC art. 363-2, para. 3.
112 See id.
13 See id. art. 635, para. 1, subpara. 19-3.
114 See KCC art. 363.
11 See Jin-gun Chung, Mi-gook-gye fund, Nong-sbim-ae aek-myun-boon-hal
yo-goo [American Fund Requests Stock Split from Nongsbim], MAEIL Bus. NEWS,
Aug. 24, 1998.
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corporate governance.116 The lack of such external discipline was
one reason why principal shareholders could maintain low share
ownership and minimal risk exposure while dominating corpo-
rate affairs. The new provisions were also considered a means to
facilitate corporate restructuring efforts. Overall, the amend-
ments of the merger section sought to streamline the merger pro-
cedures, enhance the protection of shareholders, and assure ade-
quate protection for management."'
3.4.1. Streamlining Merger Procedures
Various procedural modifications were made to facilitate the
merger process. First, the special majority voting procedure re-
quired for special resolutions, such as mergers or other major
corporate changes, was modified.' Many public companies had
trouble meeting the quorum requirement for special resolutions,
which called for attendance at the shareholders' meeting by the
shareholders of at least one-half of all shares entitled to vote.
119
The special majority voting procedure now provides that a
merger may be approved with just a two-thirds vote of the share-
holders who attend the shareholders' meeting. To ensure some
degree of representativeness, this two-thirds vote must consist of
at least one-third of the total shares entitled to vote. Thus, the
original mandatory quorum requirement for voting on a special
resolution was replaced with a simpler "voting quorum."
116 See Namju Cho, Korea Takes New Step, supra note 48.
117 See Dong-yun Chung, Hwoe-sa-ui hap-byung-jul-cha-ui gan-so-hwa-wa Joo-
Joo-ui bo-ho [The Simplification of Merger Procedures and the Protection of Sare.
holders], Public Hearing on the Amendments to the Commercial Code, Minis-
try of Justice, Apr. 1, 1998, at 11. This shareholder proposal right existed for
listed companies under the Securities Exchange Law and was first exercised by
shareholders of Korea International Merchant Bank in April 1997. See Gwang-
jin Oh, Han-woi-jong-geum no-jo geum-yung-gwon chut joo-Joojae-an-gwon heng.
sa [Korea International Merchant Bank Labor First to Exercise Shareholder Pro.
posalRight in Financial Industry], KOREA ECON. DAILY, Apr. 15, 1997.
" See 1995 KCC art. 434. Previously, the quorum requirement for"spe-
cial resolutions" called for the attendance of shareholders representing at least
one-half of the total voting shares and a two-thirds approval among them. Be-
cause this quorum normally could not be met, unvoted shares that were depos-
ited with the Korean Deposit Agency would be counted through shadow vot-
ing toward the quorum requirement. See SEA art. 174-6; see also Explanatory
Notes, supra note 83, at 151-53.
119 Once the quorum is met, special resolutions require the approval of at
least two-thirds of the total shares actually attending the shareholders' meeting.
See KCC art. 434.
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Another change to the new merger regulations allows compa-
nies to dispense with the final reporting requirements to share-
holders.1 20 Under the previous provisions, after a merger was ap-
proved, but before the final merger registration, the board of
directors had to prepare a final report to shareholders at a special
shareholders' meeting regarding all matters relating to the pro-
posed merger. 12' The drafters of the 1995 KCC believed that call-
ing a shareholders' meeting solely for this purpose was unneces-
sary, especially because shareholders would have already
approved the merger, and the merger could not be undone or
changed at that time."z Therefore, under the new procedures, the
drafters provided that the company may instead disclose any in-
formation regarding the merger according to the public notice re-
quirements in the company's articles of incorporation."
From another perspective, new mergers and acquisitions regu-
lations were also needed to help desperate companies restructure
and attract capital following the credit crunch of the financial cri-
sis. Many companies at the time sought to merge failing or
weaker subsidiaries with sister companies. One way to facilitate
corporate restructuring was the adoption of a short-form merger
procedure and a small-scale merger procedure.
Established in 1995, the short-form merger procedure was fur-
ther modified under the 1998 KCC 24 Certain companies being
acquired can use the short-form merger procedure to substitute
the mandatory shareholder approval process with the mere accep-
tance of the board of directors. The short-form merger can be
used where the acquiring company purchases more than ninety
percent of the target company's stock or if all of the target com-
pany's shareholders agree to adopt the procedure.121 Short-form
mergers, therefore, allow companies to dispense with the re-
quirement of convening a separate shareholders' meeting for ap-
120 See 1995 KCC art. 526; 1998 KCC art. 527.
"2 See Explanatory Notes, supra note 83, at 195.
12 See id. at 196.
123 See KCC art. 289.
124 See 1995 KCC art. 522; 1998 KCC art. 527-2.
125 See 1998 KCC art. 527-2. Under the old article 522 of the 1995 KCC,
when the short-form merger procedure was first established, the acquiring
company had to acquire 100% of the target company's shares or receive an ap-
proval by all of the target company's shareholders.
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proval. Subsidiaries controlled by parent companies, for instance,
can be absorbed in a simplified manner.
The new KCC also introduced a small-scale merger procedure
so that large acquiring companies could purchase smaller compa-
nies more easily. According to Article 527-3, a large acquiring
company can use the small-scale merger when it issues less than
five percent of its total shares to purchase a small company.1 26 In
small-scale mergers, the large acquiring company does not have to
obtain shareholder approval through a separate shareholders'
meeting. Such a meeting was deemed unnecessary because, given
the relatively small size of the purchase, the acquisition would not
affect the company substantially."
Finally, to accelerate the merger process, two approval dead-
lines were shortened. First, the time period allowed for creditors
to object to mergers has been reduced from a minimum of two
months to a minimum of one month.121 Second, the new
amendments reduce the time needed to merge stock from three
months to one month. 129
3.4.2. Protecting Minority Shareholders' Interests
While the new KCC simplified various merger procedures to
facilitate the corporate restructuring process, it also sought to
guarantee that this general deregulation did not infringe on the in-
terests of shareholders.130 Therefore, various shareholder rights
and disclosure requirements were concomitantly strengthened to
protect shareholders.
First, under the 1998 KCC, various documents must be made
available for inspection at the company's headquarters. During
the period extending from two weeks before the convening of the
shareholders' meeting to approve the merger, to six months after
the actual merger, the following documents must be made avail-
126 See 1998 KCC art. 527-3.
127 Recent examples of small-scale mergers have involved Kangwon Indus-
tries, Tong Yang Cement, Orion Electric, Han I1 E Wha, and Hyundai Engi-
neering and Construction merging subsidiary or related companies.
121 See 1998 KCC art. 527-5.
129 See 1995 KCC art. 440.
130 For a discussion on how minority shareholders need further protection,
see Hyun-yoon Shin, Sang-bup-sang gi-up-gyul-hap-ui sa-jun-tong-jae-wa moon.ja e-
jum [The Prior Controls, and Their Problems, in Corporate Consolidation under
the Commercial Code], 18 COM. L. REV. 51 (1999).
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able to shareholders: the merger agreement, the final balance
sheets and profit and loss statements of the respective companies,
and a document explaining the allocation of shares to the target
company's shareholders.13'
Subsequently, the board of directors must provide additional
post-merger disclosure. For a period of six months after the
merger, the directors must also provide information concerning
the status of objecting creditors, the total assets and liabilities as-
sumed from the target company, the date of the merger, and
other information related to the merger.132 This information
must be made available to shareholders for inspection at the com-
pany's headquarters.
In the case of short-form mergers, the target company's share-
holders must be notified within two weeks that a merger is pro-
ceeding without a shareholders' meeting. If they desire, the target
company's shareholders can, of course, waive this notice re-
quirement."3 The notice may be given through the public notice
process or through direct notice to individual shareholders.
Finally, to use the small-scale merger procedure, the large ac-
quiring company must state in the merger agreement that it did
not convene a formal shareholders' meeting. The large acquiring
company must also alert shareholders to the acquired company's
name, location of its headquarters, and the date of the merger
through either a public notice or individual notification.' How-
ever, a large acquiring company cannot use the small-scale merger
procedure if it has to pay more than two percent of its net assets
to purchase the small target company's shares.' Shareowners
who own more than twenty percent of the total shares can also
demand that the acquiring company use the normal merger pro-
cedure instead of the small-scale procedure. 36 Furthermore,
shareholders who object to the small-scale merger may request
appraisal rights. 3
131 See 1998 KCC art. 522-2.
112 See id. art. 527-6.
13 See id. art. 527-2.
134 See id. art. 527-3.
1 See id. para. 1.
136 See id. para. 4.
137 See id. para. 5.
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3.4.3. Accommodating Management Concerns
The simplification of the mergers procedures also raised con-
cerns among companies about the threats of hostile takeovers."
In response to these concerns, anyone that acquires more than ten
percent of the issued stock of another company must, in due
course, notify that company of their new ownership position to
provide sufficient notice to that company.139 This ten percent
disclosure rule was enacted to give fair warning so that threatened
companies would have an opportunity to defend themselves. In
particular, the effectiveness of this rule will depend on whether
acquisitions by related and interested shareholders will be effec-
tively combined when calculating the ten percent threshold to
prevent circumvention.
As an ultimate means of protection, lawmakers granted com-
panies the ability to restrict the transfer of shares. 4 A company
can require stockholders to obtain the board of directors' ap-
proval before they sell their shares. This restriction was added so
that closed corporations could maintain "mutual trust between
shareholders" by preventing unwanted shareholder participa-
tion."' It is therefore only supposed to apply to closed corpora-
tions and not to listed or public corporations.142 This restriction
only applies to newly issued shares and must be stated in the arti-
cles of incorporation; shareholders who are denied transfers may
claim appraisal rights."
'3 See Hup Choi, Woe-gook-in juk-dae-juk M&A sa-shil-sang shil.hyun uh-
ryup-da [Actually Difficult for Foreign Hostile M&As to Occur], CHOSUN ILBO,
Feb. 9, 1998.
139 See 1995 KCC art. 342-3. A similar five percent rule already exists un-
der SEA art. 200-2.
140 See 1995 KCC art. 335.
141 Explanatory Notes, supra note 83, at 84.
142 See id. at 85-86. Listed companies are excluded from this restriction un-
der the SEA.
143 In addition, if a company has decided to place this type of transfer re-
striction on a stock, convertible bond, or bond with warrant, then it must be
included in the various documents related to such securities instruments. Such
documents include the offer statements (1995 KCC arts. 302, 514, 5164), the
instrument certificates (1995 KCC arts. 356, 514, 516-4), and the securities in-
strument holder lists (1995 KCC arts. 514, 516-4). The information concerning
the restriction must be registered (1995 KCC art. 317).
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3.5. Corporate Spinoffs
In conjunction with the new mergers regulations, for the first
time corporations can spin off divisions into other corporations.
An entire section devoted to corporate spinoffs was added to the
1998 amendments of the KCC under Section 11 immediately fol-
lowing the new section on mergers."' These spinoff procedures
offer another means to assist companies in their restructuring ef-
forts. In particular, larger companies that needed to specialize
their operations or that wanted to shed corporate divisions wel-
comed the new procedures. 4
The new section on spinoffs broadly divides spinoffs into
"Standard Spinoffs" and "Spinoff Mergers." 46 A Standard Spinoff
involves a single company dividing into several different compa-
nies. Spinoff Mergers proceed one step further, occurring when a
single company divides into several different companies and then
one or more of these new companies simultaneously merge into
other preexisting companies. Short-form spinoff mergers and
small-scale spinoff mergers are also possible. 4 In either case, the
original company may or may not continue to exist, and only
stock corporations can engage in spinoffs."4
Numerous restrictions have been established to protect inter-
ested parties such as shareholders and creditors during the spinoff
process. First, shareholders must approve spinoffs with the same
special majority vote required for mergers.' Shareholders who
object to Spinoff Mergers can furthermore request appraisal
rights15 While dissenting shareholders of Standard Spinoffs do
not have appraisal rights, a provision provides that if the "burden
of the shareholders" increases as a result of a Standard Spinoff or
Spinoff Merger, then approval from all the shareholders is re-
144 See 1998 KCC sec. 11.
145 See Bok-ki Hong, Sang-bp-ae it-suh-suh Hwoe-sa-ui boon-hal-ae gwan-han
gyu-jung-ui do-ip-gum-to [Considering the Adoption of Regulations on Corporate
Spinoffs in the Commercial Code], 17 COM. L. REv. 343 (1998); CHAN-Soo
SHIN ET AL., KOREA LISTED Co. ASS'N, HWoE-SA-BooN-HAL-Ui JAE-DO-WHA-
AE GWAN-HAN YON-GOO [RESEARCH STUDY ON THE REGULATION OF
CORPORATE SPINOFFS] (Dec. 1995).
146 1998 KCC art. 530-2.
147 See 1999 KCC art. 530-11.
148 See 1998 KCC art. 5304.
149 See id. art. 530-3.
151 See id. arts. 530-11, 522-3.
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quired."'5 Creditors also have considerable rights because they
can block companies from engaging in Standard Spinoffs or
Spinoff Mergers.
15 2
Companies that remain in existence after a spinoff or compa-
nies established as a result of a spinoff are jointly and severally li-
able for all the debts of the company from which they origi-
nated."5 3 This obligation was created to deter firms from abusing
the spinoff procedure. Otherwise, abusive dominant shareholders
could, for instance, siphon assets to a spinoff company and leave
the original company as a shell with all the liabilities.
In a Standard Spinoff, if shareholders of the original company
approve of the spinoff by a special majority vote, the liabilities of
the newly established spinoff company could be limited to the
amount that the original firm invests into it.154 Similarly, for
Spinoff Mergers, the liability could be limited to the amount that
the original firm invests into the preexisting company that merges
with the spinoff. In both Standard Spinoffs and Spinoff Mergers,
if the original company continues to exist after the spinoff, then it
will only be responsible for the liability not assumed by the new
spinoff. Hanwha Living and Creative Corporation became the
first spinoff of a listed company on July 1, 1999, when it divided
into two companies.'
3.6. The Expansion ofAppraisal Rights
Dissenting shareholders can now claim appraisal rights under
a variety of new circumstances."5 6 The KCC provides that ap-
praisal rights will be offered to shareholders in the following
situations: (1) if a shareholder disagrees with a merger proposal
or a significant sale or purchase of business operations; (2) if a
151 Id. art. 530-3.
152 See id. arts. 530-9, 530-11.
153 See id. art. 530-9.
154 See id.
"' See Yoon-jae Han, Gook-nae sang-jang-sa chut gi.up.boon-hal [First Corpo-
rate Spinoff of a Domestic Listed Company], CHOSUN ILBO, May 7, 1999;
Young-sul Kwon, Han-wha-jong-hap-hwa-hak, 2 dae-sa.ro bool.li... ga-gong/
won-ryo boo-moon [Hanwha Living and Creative Corporation Divided into Tvo
Companies... Processing/Raw Materials Division], KOREA ECON. DAILY, May
3, 1999.
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shareholder disagrees with a spinoff merger; or (3) if a share-
holder's transfer of shares is denied.
157
In the first two cases, where a shareholder disagrees with a
merger or a significant sale or purchase of business operations, or
with a spinoff merger, that shareholder can request appraisal
rights. Shareholders must notify the company of their objection
before the relevant shareholders' meeting and then request ap-
praisal rights within twenty days after the shareholders' meet-
ing."58 The company must then purchase the shareholder's stock
within two months of this request.
In the case of restricted shares, shareholders must first notify
the board of directors in writing of their intention to sell their
shares to a certain person.5 9 The board of directors must notify
the shareholders within one month after receiving this notice as
to whether they approve the transfer."6 If the board rejects the
transfer, then the shareholders may ask that the company desig-
nate an appropriate recipient to purchase the shares or may de-
mand appraisal rights.'61
In any case, when a company repurchases a shareholder's
stock based on appraisal rights, the price is determined by consen-
sus between the shareholder and the company. 62 If they cannot
agree to a price, an accounting expert or a court is supposed to de-
termine the price. If more than thirty percent of the dissenting
shareholders disagree with the price decided by the accounting
expert, they can request that a court decide the appropriate
price.
163
After the price is determined and the stock is repurchased, the
company must eventually dispose of the stock in due time.' If
117 See 1995 KCC arts. 335-2, 335-6 (transfer restrictions), art. 374-2 (signifi-
cant sale or purchase of business operations), art. 522-3 (mergers), and art.530-
11 (spinoff mergers). Article 374-2 specifically applies to: (1 the sale of a
company's entire business operations or a significant portion of it; (2) the exe-
cution, change, or termination of a leasing, management transfer, profit-loss
sharing, or similar agreement involving a company's entire business operations;
or (3) the purchase of another company's entire business operations.
... See 1995 KCC art. 374-2.
159 See id. art. 335-2, para. 1.
160 See id. para. 2.
161 See id. para. 4.
162 See 1995 KCC art. 335-5.
161 See id. art. 374-2, para. 4.
164 See id. art. 341-2, para. 3.
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several dissenting shareholders exist, one question that arises is
whether the company must repurchase the various shares at the
same price. The explanatory background of 1998 KCC, while
not authoritative, suggests that the repurchase can be at the same
price if the individual shareholders agree with the company.16
3.7. Preferred Stock
A notable goal of the new KCC is to revitalize the largely de-
funct preferred stock market in Korea. First issued in 1986 by the
Oriental Brewery Company, preferred stock has been considered
a failure in Korea. 166 Prices of preferred stock have continued to
hover at discounts of over fifty percent of the price of common
stock, reflecting the lack of investor interest.
16 7
The collapse of the price of preferred shares in Korea can be
attributed to the fact that they have not offered any tangible
benefits, especially when compared to common stock. Without
exception, shares of preferred stock in Korea have been nonvot-
ing and dividend-giving.1 6' The voting rights of preferred stock
were usually cancelled in return for a "preferred" dividend. 6
The problem was that the preferred dividends were too meager to
offset the loss of the voting rights. With the increasing impor-
tance of the mergers and acquisitions market, preferred stock
without voting rights in particular became increasingly unpopu-
lar.170
Preferred stock dividends were determined by merely adding
one percent to the dividends given to common stock.17 ' This
simplistic method of calculation was used because Article 344 of
the previous Commercial Code only provided that dividends had
"' See Explanatory Notes, supra note 83, at 122.
166 See Chan-hyung Chung, Woo.sun-joo [Preferred Stock], GO-SHI-GYE,
Mar. 1995, at 29.
117 The discount rate has been increasing recently with the advent of new
preferred stock. See Analysis of Listing and Current Market Price of Preferred
Stock, Public Disclosure Department, KSE Press Release, at 6-7 (July 30, 1999)
(on file with author).
168 See Chan-hyung Chung, supra note 166. Preferred stock has also been
nonparticating and noncumulative for dividend payments, and preferred stock
that provides stock dividends or preferred distribution in the case of dissolu-
tion has not existed. See id.
169 KCC arts. 344, 370.




20003 KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE AMENDMENTS 307
to be "preferred" to the amount of dividends awarded to com-
mon stock, without any further explanation as to what "pre-
ferred" meant. Dividends for common stock were already at a
low level and typically awarded based on par value." Therefore,
in determining the preferred dividend, one percent of the mini-
mum 5000 won (U.S. $4.17) par value of stock, or fifty won (U.S.
$0.04), was added to whatever dividends common stockholders
received."
To enhance the appeal of preferred stock, instead of paying a
preferred stock dividend that merely fluctuated according to the
dividends given to common stock, companies must now set in
their articles of incorporation a minimum dividend that will be
granted to preferred stockholders. 4 This stipulation adds pre-
dictability and encourages higher dividends. As a result, most
companies have fixed their minimum preferred stock dividends at
nine percent of the 5000 won par value, which equals 450 won
(U.S. $0.38).'7s Preferred stock that provides stock dividends or
preferred distribution in the case of dissolution does not have to
follow this minimum requirement. 17  This new minimum re-
quirement does not apply retroactively and only applies to pre-
ferred stock issued after October 1, 1996. l77
Finally, to encourage the issuance of preferred stocks that
award their dividends in the form of stock instead of cash, stock
dividends can now be paid as any type of stock.7 This means
17 See infra Section 3.8 for a further description of the generally low divi-
dend policy.
" See Bup-jae hyun-an [Current Legislative Issues], National Assembly Sa-
moo-chuh, 95-15, at 8-9 (Oct. 24, 1995).
174 See 1995 KCC art. 344. In February 1997, the Korea GreenCross Cor-
poration was the first company to issue preferred stock with a minimum divi-
dend. See Seung-il Hong, Choe-jub-bae-dang-ryul bo-jang joo-shik deung-jang
[Minimum Dividend Guaranteed Stock Appear], JOONGANG ILBO, Mar. 19,
1997.
17s Forty-five percent of preferred stocks listed under the new regulations
have set their minimum dividend at nine percent. See Jeong Hwan Wui, Shin-
hyung woo-sun-joo bal-haeng gae-hwoek sang-jang-hwoe-sa jun-chae-ui jul-ban [Half
ofListed Companies Plan to Issue New PreTerred Shares], MAEIL Bus. NEWS, Mar.
27, 1997.
176 See 1998 KCC art. 344.
177 Article 4 of the Addendum to the 1995 KCC states that the provisions
of Article 344 will only apply to preferred stocks issued after October 1, 1996,
and will not apply retroactively to previously issued stock.
178 See 1995 KCC art. 462-2, para. 1.
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preferred stockholders can conceivably receive stock dividends in
either preferred stock or even common stock.179
3.8. Dividends
As mentioned earlier, a critical problem has been that divi-
dends for common stock have been woefully inadequate."s' In
1997, for instance, the average dividend yield in Korea was 3.22%.
From 1994 to 1998, companies averaged between 403 won (U.S.
$0.36) and 475 won (U.S. $0.40) in dividends per share."' Com-
panies declared only the bare minimum dividend needed to meet
the listing requirements or regulatory standards.8 2
Without sufficient dividend income, the investment goals for
investors naturally shifted to short-term speculative trading in-
stead of long-term capital gains.8 3 In a vicious circle, short-term
investors would not persevere in monitoring or pressuring man-
agement for higher dividends, management would not feel obli-
gated to declare more dividends than necessary, and, with low
dividends, shareholders would lose their incentive for long-term
investment.
The 1995 KCC introduced a variety of incentives in an at-
tempt to boost dividends, especially stock dividends. First, as
179 See Explanatory Notes, supra note 83, at 168-69. One question that re-
mains is whether shareholders of previously issued preferred stock who receive
newly issued stock should receive preferred stock according to the new rules
that stipulate the minimum preferred dividend or according to the old rules
that do not. According to an advisory opinion issued by the Korean Securities
Supervisory Board, "old preferred stock" should continue to receive the same
type of old preferred stock when receiving new issuances. See Moo-sang.jeung.Ia
woo-sun-joo-bae-jung 'non-Ian' ['Dispute' over Distribution of Preferred Stock],
KOREA ECON. DAILY, Sept. 26, 1996. In April 1998, the Stock Supervisory
Board was merged into the Financial Supervisory Service. See Financial Super-
visory Commission (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://www.fsc.go.kr>.
180 See Jae-oh Yoon, 01 joo-chong bae-dang yang-geuk-hwa ddoo.yut
[Amount of Dividends Declared at This Year's Shareholders' Meetings Clearly Di.
verge], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Mar. 21, 1999.
181 See KOREA LISTED CO. A5S'N, 12 WOL GYUL-SAN SANG-JANG-HWOE-SA
1998 GYUL-SAN-SHIL-JUK MIT JAE-MOO-BOON-SUK [1998 ACCOUNT STATISTICS
AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF DECEMBER ACCOUNT LISTED COMPANIES] 16
(Apr. 1999) (on file with author).
"82 To be listed on the First Section [Jae-l-bu] of the KSE, a company with
a par value of 5000 won must issue at least a 300 won dividend. If a company
does not issue dividends in two of the past three years, it will drop to the Sec-
ond Section [Jae-2.bu]. See KSE, Yu.ga-jeung-kwon-sang-jang-gyu-jung [Regula.
tions on Listing Securities] arts. 31.3, 32.5.
183 See KSE Press Release, supra note 37.
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mentioned previously, companies may now award stock divi-
dends in any type of stock they wish.'84 This additional potential
enhances the options, and hence the attractiveness, of stocks.
Second, a new calculation method has been developed for stock
dividends. When the stock dividend to be awarded is less than
one share and amounts only to fractional shares, companies may
combine those fractional shares and either auction them or sell
the stock on the stock market and then return the monetary pro-
ceeds as dividends to the shareholder. 8 ' In the past, the KCC did
not provide for methods of calculating fractional shares. 8'
Even more significantly, under the 1998 KCC, directors can
declare cash dividends within a given year on a one-time basis.
This option must be provided for in the company's articles of in-
corporation."" Directors, however, must be careful when declar-
ing interim dividends. If they declare interim dividends when the
company lacks sufficient net assets on its balance sheet, the direc-
tors will be held jointly and severally liable for the difference. 8
Directors can only avoid this type of liability if they demonstrate
that they have met their duty of care.8 9 According to the Korea
Stock Exchange, of the 516 listed companies with fiscal years end-
ing in December 1998, forty-one have included a provision in
their articles of incorporation that allows for interim dividends. 19"
Finally, companies must award dividends within one month
after the shareholders' meeting at which the dividends were ap-
proved, unless shareholders have decided otherwise.' 9' The time
period was shortened from two months because companies would
consistently force shareholders to wait the full two-month pe-
riod."
184 1995 KCC art. 462-2.
185 See id.
186 See Explanatory Notes, supra note 83, at 168-69.
187 See 1998 KCC arts. 462-3.
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 See Sung-won Lee, Dae-duk-san-up deung 22 sa aek-myun boon-hal: 12 wol
bup-in jung-gwan byun-gyung [December Accounting Year Companies Make
Changes in Articles f Incorporation: Daeduk Industries and 22 Other Companies
Providefor Stock Splits], MAEIL Bus. NEWS, Mar. 30, 1999.
191 See 1998 KCC art. 344 and 1998 KCC art. 464-2. Interim dividends
must be awarded one month after they are declared by the board of directors.
See 1998 KCC art. 464-2.
192 See Explanatory Notes, supra note 83, at 173.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
3.9. Capital Accumulation, Par Value, Stock Splits, and Stock
Options
Companies can raise capital more efficiently under the various
revisions to the KCC. After incorporating, companies can set the
amount of authorized stock according to their needs. In earlier
KCC versions, firms could not increase their authorized stock
more than four times the previous amount.193 Every time this
relative limit was reached, companies had to call a shareholders'
meeting to increase the authorized stock by amending the articles
of incorporation. The revision seeks to make it less cumbersome
for firms to attract capital.194
The restrictions governing the issuance of bonds have also
been eased. Under the revised Article 470, companies can issue
bonds up to four times the amount of assets provided on their
balance sheet from the previous accounting year.19 Previously,
companies were limited to twice the sum of their stated capital
and reserves or, if total assets were less than this sum, twice their
total assets.9
The 1995 KCC allows holders of convertible bonds or bonds
with warrants to convert their bonds even when the shareholder
list has been closed for recording purposes prior to the sharehold-
ers' meeting.' This makes bonds more attractive by giving
bondholders added liquidity. Bonds converted to stock can not
be used to participate at the shareholders' meeting for which the
shareholder list has been closed.'
The 1998 KCC aims to increase corporate liquidity and allow
companies to raise capital more easily in other ways. First, the
minimum par value of stocks has been dramatically lowered from
5000 won (U.S. $4.17) to 100 won (U.S. $0.08).199 While Korea
still does not allow non-par value stock, lowering the minimum
193 See 1995 KCC art. 437, limiting the amount of authorized stock. This
section was repealed in 1995.
194 See Explanatory Notes, supra note 83, at 156-57.
195 See 1995 KCC art. 470.
196 See id.
197 See id. arts. 516, 516-10.
191 See id arts. 350, 516, 516-9.
199 See 1998 KCC art. 329. But see Ki-won Choi, supra note 35 (arguing
that the par value should not have been lowered below the 1962 requirement
of 500 won (U.S. $0.41)).
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par value helps entities, such as venture companies, to raise capital
more effectively.
Korean corporations can now execute stock splits.2"' Stock
splits require a special majority shareholder vote and must follow
the same procedures used for stock mergers.20' In conjunction
with the lower minimum par value, stock splits have become eas-
ier to achieve. They enhance liquidity and allow stock prices to
be adjusted to make mergers and acquisitions more attractive.
Stock splits are increasingly gaining in popularity: of the 516
listed companies with fiscal years ending in December 1998,
twenty-two companies decided to carry out stock splits, resulting
in lower par values. 2
Finally, unlisted companies can issue stock options in the
same manner as listed companies. 3  Companies can issue stock
options at a predetermined rate to directors, auditors and em-
ployees after a special majority vote. Shareholders who have
more than ten percent of the issued shares, those who have "ac-
tual influence" in the election or termination of directors or audi-
tors, or direct relatives of any of these persons, are specifically in-
eligible to receive stock options. The total amount of stock
options cannot exceed ten percent of the total number of issued
shares. Persons with stock options can exercise them after hold-
ing their position for at least two years after the special majority
shareholder vote to issue the stock options. Stock options are not
transferable, but may be inherited.
4. THE CHANGING CORPORATE LANDSCAPE
The recent amendments to the KCC have helped reshape Ko-
rea's corporate environment. The most visible developments af-
fect corporate governance. A host of practically defunct, but
critical, legal provisions in the KCC were used for the first time.
For example, the lower shareholder holding requirements have
helped once passive shareholders, particularly those with non-
principal interests, to assert their rights in an unprecedented fash-
200 See 1998 KCC art. 329-2.
201 See id. arts. 440 to 444.
202 See Bong-kwon Park, Aek-myon-boon-hal gi-up si-jan-soo.ik-ryul 3 bae i-
sang cho-gwa-soo-ik-ryul ol-lyuh [Companies that Split Stock Had Profit Yields
Three Times Greater Than that of Market Yields], MAEIL Bus. NEWS, Mar. 24,
1999.
203 See 1999 KCC arts. 340-2 to 340-5, 341-2; SEA art. 189-4.
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ion.2  Shareholders have brought the first-ever derivative actions
against directors and have even made challenges for corporate
control.
211
Although not yet numerous, hostile takeover bids have been
attempted and target companies have learned to employ various
types of defensive tactics. 6 The first successful hostile takeover
under the SEA is considered to be Savoy Hotel's acquisition of
Shinsung Trading."
A confluence of other factors has increased the effectiveness of
the changes to the KCC. Upon realizing that they have rights,
shareholders are becoming more active participants in corporate
affairs. 08 Investors are challenging management regarding deci-
sions, performance, and misconduct.2  Foreign investors are also
204 See Mark L. Clifford, The Stars of Asia, BUS. WK. INT'L EDITION, June
29, 1998, at 70; Jon E. Hilsenrath & Namju Cho, Shareholders Begin to Show
Muscle in Korea, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1998, at 1; Moon Ihlwan, The
Shareholder Revolt Comes to Korea, Bus. WK., Feb. 23, 1998, at 52; Michael
Lewis, The World's Biggest Going-out-ofBusiness Sale, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May
31, 1998, at 34, 53; Sandra Sugawara, South Korea Takes on Family Business
Groups, WASH. POST., Mar. 11, 1999, at E2; Jennifer Veale, This Time Around,
Goliath May Strike Back, BUS. WK. INT'L EDITION, Mar. 29, 1999, at 26;
George Wehrfritz, A Revolution in the Boardrooms, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 9, 1998,
at 14-17. The minority shareholder movement in Korea has been largely
sp earheaded by the Participatory Economic Committee ("PEC") of the Peo-
ple s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy ("PSPD"), a public interest group.
See Participatory Economic Committee (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://ww.
pspd.org/pec>.
205 See infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
first derivative action.
206 Some recent target companies where management control was chal-
lenged include Caproraktam, Hangdo Merchant Bank, Ulsan Merchant Bank
and Midopa. See Byung-gi Hong, Caproraktam joo-chong-suh ddo kyuk-dol [An-
other Collision at Caproraktam's Shareholders' Meeting], JOONGANG ILBO, Feb.
28, 1996; Byung-il Yeh, Hang-do-jong-geum ]i-]oo-hwoe-sa gong-bang [Hangdo
Merchant Bank Having Holding Company Debate], CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 4, 1997;
Byung-il Yeh, Mi-do-pa M&A boon-jaeng bon-gyuk-hwa [Midopa M&A Dispute
Begins in Earnest], CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 25, 1997; Byung-il Yeh, Ul-san-jong-
geum-do M&A bi-sang [Ulsan Merchant Bank also Faces an M&A Emergency],
CHOSUN ILBO, Dec. 11, 1996.
20 See Hun-soo Kim, Shin-sung-moo-yuk M&A ma-moo-ri [M&A of Shinsung
Trading Completed], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Nov. 27, 1997; Byung-il Yeh, Savoy
Hotel Shin-sung-moo-yok in-soo [Savoy Hotel Acquires Shinsung Trading],
CHOSUN ILBO, Aug. 1, 1997.
208 See Hong-ryul Chun, supra note 110, at 77.
209 See Hae-won Choi, In Seoul: South Korean Companies Bend to Assuage
Activists, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1999, at 13; Sung-il Hong,Joo-joo ja-bon-
joo-ui shi-hum moo-dae [Shareholder Capitalism Test Case], JOONGANG ILBO,
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assuming a more demanding presence, acquiring companies, and
questioning management.21' The urgency of the financial crisis
forced companies to place an emphasis on shareholder value in
order to attract large-scale capital infusions and accept debt for
equity swaps. This led to a relinquishment or co-sharing of man-
agement control in many cases. Several notable examples will be
examined to illustrate how the new corporate regulations and the
new environment have affected corporate Korea.
4.1. The Kickoff: Daehan Pulp and Oriental Brewery
In October 1996, the first signs of a changing corporate envi-
ronment emerged. On October 22, 1996, eighteen minority
shareholders of Daehan Pulp requested the convening of a special
shareholders' meeting to terminate the chairman of the board of
directors.2"' This request for a special shareholders' meeting was
considered the first case in which shareholders formally exercised
their shareholder rights since the enactment of the KCC in
1962.212 Shareholders sought to hold Daehan Pulp's management
accountable for losses they suffered when Daehan Pulp initially
disclosed and then withdrew its intentions to enter the telecom-
munications sector.
Management, in contrast, claimed they were victims of stock
manipulation and that the shareholder action itself was being led
Feb. 16, 1998, at 27; Charles Lee, Fairer Shares, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 1,
1999, at 56 (stating that "the chaebols have woken up to the potency of share-
holder activism and have showed an uncharacteristic deference to it" and that
"Jang and his cohorts at the PSPD have unleashed seismic changes in Korean
corporate culture"); Jung-Jae Lee, So-aek-joojoo gwon-li-chat-gi gae-in-deul mok-
so-ri kuh-jyuh [As Minority Shareholders Claim Rights, Voices of Individuals Get
Larger], JOONGANG ILBO, Apr. 1, 1998.
211 See discussion infra Section 4.4.
211 See Young-soo Kim, Daehan Pulp/Too-ja-ja son-shil-ip-hin dae-pyo-i-sa
twoe-jin.yo-goo [Daehan Pulp: Demanding the Removal of the Representative Di-
rector that Caused Losses to Investors], CHOSUN ILBO, Nov. 7, 1996, at 13; Sang-
hoon Song, So-soojo-joo joo-chong-so-jip yo-goo non-lan/Daehan Pulp [Debate
Over Minority Shareholders' Request to Convene a Shareholders' Meeting/Daehan
Pulp], JOONGANG ILBO, Nov. 7, 1996, at 31 [hereinafter Sang-hoon Song,De-
bate over Request].
212 See Dong-han Lee, Jip-joong boonsuk- So-aek-joo-joo woon-dong [Special
Focus: Minority Shareholder Movement], CHOSUN ILBO, Apr. 2, 1999, at 12;
Sang-hoon Song, Debate Over Request, supra note 211.
213 See Sang-hoon Song, Debate over Request, supra note 211.
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by manipulators.214 Eventually, before a court decision was
reached, this dispute was settled when the shareholders dropped
their request and reached an agreement with Daehan Pulp's man-
agement.2 15  This case nevertheless had significant precedential
value and opened a new dimension in relations between share-
holders and management.
Shortly after the Daehan Pulp case, shareholders of the Orien-
tal Brewery ("OB") company followed suit and in November
1996, exercised their shareholder rights. The OB case arose when
a subsidiary of OB sought to expand its market presence in cer-
tain regional markets and sell soju, a Korean liquor, directly in
competition with several local manufacturers.2 6
In response to this challenge, three local soju companies joined
forces and began acquiring shares in OB as a countermeasure. Af-
ter acquiring a fifteen percent stake in OB, they then requested
the first-ever inspection of a company's corporate books." This
type of shareholder strategy was one of the first of its kind.
Given generally opaque Korean accounting practices, a request
for an inspection would be a considerable challenge to almost any
company because it could expose sensitive financial information
and accounting irregularities. OB countered that this inspection
request was an abuse of shareholder rights to intimidate it into
withdrawing from the regional soju markets.218
On January 24, 1997, the Seoul District Court issued an opin-
ion approving the petition to inspect OB's books.219 This deci-
21 See Young-soo Kim, "Dae-han-pulp" bon-gyuk-dae-gyul dol.ip [Serious
Challenge forDaehan Pulp Begins], CHOSUN ILBo, Nov. 8, 1996.
21 See Jin-woo Lee, Daehan Pulp so-aek-joo-joo "joo-chong.so" chui-ha [Dae.
han Pulp Small Shareholders Withdraw Shareholders' Meeting Action], MAEIL
Bus. NEWS, Jan. 8, 1997, at 21.
216 See Sang-hoon Song, "Gyung-wol ji-bang.jin-chool' bup-jung-ssa.woom [Le-
gal Battle over 'Gyungwol's Entry into Regional Market], JOONGANG ILBO,
Nov. 19, 1996 [hereinafter Sang-hoon Song,Legal Battle].
217 For another recent example of a court finding that shareholders have a
right to inspect a company's records provided they have a legitimate reason
and meet the relevant holding requirement, see Judgment Mar. 11, 1998, Seoul
Ji-bang-bup-won [District Court], Jae 19 Min-sa-bu [19th Civil Division], 97
Kahap 68790.
211 See Sang-hoon Song, Legal Battle, supra note 216.
219 See Sang-ryul Lee,Ji-bang-so.joo 3 gae-sa-ae OB jang-boo yol-lam huh.yong
[Three Local Soju Companies Allowed to Inspect OB's Books], JOONGANG ILBO,
Jan. 23, 1997, at 4; Myung-soo Suh, So-soo-joo-joo.deul kyung-young gam-shi
hwal-balyei-go [Many Predict Minority Shareholders WillActively Monitor Corpo-
rate Management], JOONGANG ILBO, Jan. 24, 1997, at 5; Jung-hwan Wui,So-joo-
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sion became the first case where a court formally recognized the
exercise of a shareholder's rights under the KCC.' The Court
held that the shareholders had met the necessary holding re-
quirement and were therefore entitled to exercise their legally
guaranteed rights. Ultimately, the inspection was not carried out
because the parties reached a compromise. Nevertheless, both the
Daehan Pulp and OB cases were significant because they awak-
ened shareholders and corporate Korea to the potential impact
and importance of shareholder rights."
4.2. Challenges to Corporate Control: Hanwha Merchant Bank
and Midopa Department Store
In another notable episode in Korean corporate history, a
longstanding minority investor attempted to assume control of a
financial institution. This challenge was significant not only as
the first major takeover attempt in Korea, but furthermore be-
cause the target, Hanwha Merchant Bank ("HMB"), was a sub-
sidiary of a chaebol conglomerate, the Hanwha Group.'m Ui-song
Park, the second largest shareholder, amassed a near dominant
forty percent of the outstanding shares of HMB, primarily
through his company, Woopoong Mutual Savings and Finance,
and another friendly partner.' On December 6, 1996, Park an-
joo, Sang-jang-sa jang-boo-yeol-lam chut huh-yong [Minority Shareholders Allowed
for the First Time to Inspect Corporate Books of a Listed Company], MAEIL BUS.
NEWS, Jan. 22, 1997.
220 See Jung-hwan Wui, supra note 219. In a subsequent opinion, the Seoul
High Court reversed a lower court decision and found that the company has
the burden to prove that a shareholder's request is unreasonable. See Myung-
jin Lee, [Bup-won] Gyung- -mot ib-jeung mot-hae-do ju-ju jang-bu yol-lam-
gyon bo-jang, [Courts: Sharehoders Inspection Rights Guaranteed Even if Mis-
mangement Not Proven], CHOSUN ILBo, Dec. 25, 1998. Gyo-chang Kim sug-
gested earlier that companies should have the burden of proof. See Gyo-chang
Kim, Sang-bup-Joong hwoe-sa-pyun-ui gaejung-ui-gyun [Opinion on the Amend-
ment of the Stock Corporation Section of the Korean Commercial Code], L. TIMES
(Seoul), Mar. 12, 1998, at 14.
21 See Joo-byung Park, So-soo-joojoo-deul gwon-li-haeng-sa neul-ub-nan-da
[More Cases of Shareholders Exercising Their Rights], KOREA ECON. DAiLY, Jan.
3, 1997.
22 See Sang-hoon Song & Shin-sung Shik, Dae-gi-up sang-dae gook-nae chut
M&A [First Domestic M&A of a Large Conglomerate], JOONGANG ILBo, Dec. 7,
1996, at 1; Woopoong Mutual Secures 40% Stake in Unit of Hanwha, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1996, at 3.
' See Sang-hoon Song & Shin-sung Shik, supra note 222; Woopoong Mu-
tual Secures 40% Stake in Unit ofHanwha, supra note 222.
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nounced that he had filed a petition with the Seoul District Court
requesting specific performance to convene a special shareholders'
meeting so that he could claim control of the management of the
company2
4
While corporate Korea looked on in great anticipation, on
January 7, 1997, the board of I-RIMB employed a surprising take-
over defense. They nullified Park's efforts through a private
placement of forty billion won (U.S. $33.3 million) in convertible
bonds ("CB") to three friendly partners." s  The three pro-
management parties that acquired the convertible bonds then
immediately converted the bonds into stock. These white squires
gained seventeen percent of the total voting shares of HMB and
helped management to successfully dilute shares favorable to
Park.2
6
Park, in turn, challenged management's takeover defense. He
attempted to enjoin the voting rights of the management-friendly
shareholders who purchased the convertible bonds.m He claimed
that the issuance of the convertible bonds by I-MB's management
to protect their control violated their fiduciary duty under the
KCC.28 Although sympathetic to Park's claim, the Seoul District
Court ultimately rejected Park's arguments.2 9 The District
Court stated that, despite the interests of shareholders, the voting
rights stemming from the convertible bonds could not be can-
celled at that stage because the instruments had been already is-
4 See Sang-hoon Song & Shin-sung Shik, supra note 222.
The three friendly partners were Samshin-Allstate, HiFive, and
Donghung Electric. See Myung-soo Suh, Han-wha-jong.geum sa-mo-sa-chae jun.
kyuk bal.haeng [Hanwha Merchant Bank Issues Private Placement of CBs],
JOONGANG ILBO, Jan. 9, 1997, at 3.
26 See Myung-soo Suh, Han-wha-jong-geum sa-mo CB chutjoo-shik jun.hwan
[Hanwha Merchant Bank Privately Plced-CB Converted into Stock], JOONGANG
ILBO, Jan. 12, 1997, at 1.
227 See KCC art. 424.
2"8 See Byung-il Yeh, Han-whajong.geum: Gyung-young-gwon hyang-bang
bup-won-su pan-ga-reum-nal-dut [Hanwha Merchant Bank- Appears the Future of
Management Control Will Be Decided by the Courts], CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 9,
1997. Fourteen minority shareholders also brought suit against the issuance of
the convertible bonds. Han-wha-jong-geum so-aek-joo-joo so-song [Minority
Shareholders ofHanwha Merchant Sue], JOONGANG ILBO, Jan. 11, 1997, at 1.
229 See Judgment of Feb. 6, 1997, Seoul Chi-bang-bup-won [District Court],
Jae 50 Min-sa-bu [50th Civil Division], 97 Kkahap 118; see also Byung-il Yeh,
Han-wha jong-geum in-soo shi-do moo-san [Hanwha Merchant Bank Takeover At.
tempt Thwarted, CHOSUN ILBO, Feb. 7, 1997, at 9.
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sued and converted into stock.Y The court was concerned that
denying the voting rights of the stock would undermine the
"safety of the market.""' With their additional voting power se-
cured, Hanwha narrowly defeated Park's takeover attempts at the
special shareholders' meeting held on February 13, 1997.z 2
This district court ruling was problematic for a number of
reasons. The converted stocks in question had yet to be listed;
furthermore, the original purchasers still held the converted
stocks. Therefore, it is not clear why there would have been any
serious market disruption if their voting rights were denied. On
appeal, Park requested an injunction to cancel the convertible
bonds. 3 The Seoul High Court, in turn, agreed that the issuance
of the convertible bonds should be cancelled because they in-
fringed on the rights of shareholders." The court cited that the
primary purpose of the issuance of the bonds was to defend man-
agement's control." s However, the High Court ultimately de-
ferred judgment on whether the voting rights should be denied.
During this dramatic series of events, several rarely-employed
provisions of the KCC were once again used. Park's request for a
special shareholders' meeting, for instance, was considered to be
only the second case, after Daehan Pulp, of a shareholder in Ko-
rea bringing such a request." Next, as with the OB case, Park
asked for an inspection of the corporate books." Third, the spe-
cial shareholders' meeting that was held produced the first-ever
230 See Judgment of Feb. 6, 1997, supra note 229.
231 Id.
2 See Sang-hoon Song, Han-wha "Jong-geum gyung-young-gwon" bang-uh
[Hanwha Defends Challenge Against 'Merchant Bank Management'I, JOONGANG
ILBo, Feb. 14, 1997, at 26.
" See Judgment of May 13, 1997, Seoul Go-deung-bup-won [High Court],




236 KCC art. 366.
17 See Sang-hoon Song & Shin-sung Shik,supra note 222.
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proxy fight in Korea."8 This battle for control eventually became
moot when -MB was declared insolvent. 9
At about the same time as the 1-IMB case, another major hos-
tile takeover attempt occurred. On January 23, 1997, Dongbang
Peregrine Securities announced that it wished to elect a new man-
agement for Midopa Department Store.24 Midopa was the flag-
ship company of the thirty-fourth largest conglomerate in Korea,
the Dainong Group. Dongbang Peregrine claimed that Midopa
could be managed more effectively.241 Not only did this case in-
volve another challenge against a chaebol company, but it was also
a hostile takeover attempt that was launched by an entirely out-
side conglomerate.
Following the Hanwha experience and other recent examples,
several provisions of the KCC were utilized again. First, Dong-
bang Peregrine declared its interest in inspecting Midopa's corpo-
238 See KCC art. 368; see also Byung-il Yeh, Hanwha.Park Ui-song: Han-
wha-jong-geum wui-im-jang]eng-tal- un, CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 30, 1999. The first
proxy solicitation initiated by a foreign shareholder occurred in March 1998
against SK Telecom. See infra notes 268-70 and accompany text for a detailed
discussion of the SK Telecom proxy solicitation.
' See In-soo Kim, Woe-hwan-wui-gi Joo-bum boo-shil-jong-geum.sa pa-san-
chuh-ri-do him-deul-uh [It's Also Difficut to Liquidate the Main Culprits of the
Foreign Currency Crisis, the Improperly Run Merchant Banks], MAEIL BUS.
NEWS, Oct. 22, 1998.
240 See Byung-il Yeh, Mi-do-pa-joo-cbong-suh ui-gyul.gwon haeng-sa [Exercis-
ing Shareholder Rights at the Midopa Shareholders' Meeting], CHOSUN ILBO, Jan.
24, 1997.
241 See id. Some reports claimed that Dongbang Peregrine was merely
greenmailing Midopa on behalf of unknown foreign investors that reportedly
held up to 20% of Midopa's shares. See Young-shin Yoon, Hongkong Money:
gook-nae joong-gyun-gi-up-joo jip-joong-mae-jip [Hong Kong Money: Concentrate
Purchases a/ Stock of Middle Size Domestic Companies], CHOSUN ILBo, Feb. 7,
1997. The Securities Supervisory Board censured Dongbang.Peregrine for"il-
legal parking," (i.e., using a third party to acquire Midopa shares to avoid dis-
closure requirements), which was considered one of the first such cases ever.
See Byung-il Yeh, Bool-bup Parking' haeng-wui gi-seung [llegal 'Parking' Practice
Flourishes], CHOSUN ILBO, July 9, 1997, at 12. Ultimately, Shindongbang, the
joint venture partner of Peregrine that established Dongbang-Peregrine, later
emerged as the real suitor seeking to take control of Midopa. See Byung-il Yeh,
Shin-dong-bang Group: Mi-do-pa-loo mae-jip hwak-in [Shindongbang Group Con-
firms It Purchased Mi'dopa Shares], CHOSUN ILBO, Mar. 5, 1997. See generally
Seong C. Gweon, Play a Fair Game, Please, KOREA HERALD, Mar. 12, 1997
(discussing the various financial regulations breached during the deal).
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rate books.242 Second, Shindongbang requested a special share-
holders' meeting to elect new management.243
Midopa, in the meantime, followed HMB's strategy and issued
a private placement of fifty billion won (U.S. $41.7 million)
worth of convertible bonds and, later, bonds with warrants.2 In
this case, however, the Seoul District Court issued an injunction
preventing Midopa from offering the convertible bonds or the
bonds with warrants. The court found that the Midopa case
differed from the Hanwha case because the injunction was re-
quested before the bonds were issued and therefore a compelling
public interest to protect the market did not exist.246
While Midopa tried to defend itself, another unheard of event
occurred. One of Korea's three major investment trusts, Korea
Investment Trust Company ("KITC"), initially opposed Mi-
dopa's attempt to issue the privately placed convertible bonds.
KITC threatened that if Midopa issued the convertible bonds, in
the "interest of minority shareholders and institutional share-
holders," it would transfer its 7.7% share of Midopa stock to the
party threatening the takeover. This marked a rare occurrence
of an institutional investor publicly acting on behalf of the inter-
ests of its customers against actions taken by a company in which
242 See Byung-il Yeh, "Mi-do-pa M&A pa-moon" joo-yok Paul Pheby, jeung-
gwon-jun-moon-ga-in-ga gyo-ran-ja-in-ga [Paul Pheby, the Main Actor oJ the "Re-
percussions of the Midopa M&A": Is He a Securities Specialist or a Market Dis-
rupter], CHOSUN ILBO, Feb. 2, 1997.
243 See Myung-soo Sub, Shin-dong-bang, Mi-do- a-jang-ak jun-myun-gong-sae
[Shindongbang Frontal Offense to Take Control of Midopa], JOONGANG ILBO,
Mar. 13, 1997. Although Midopa was able to withstand Slindongbang's chal-
lenge, in the end the entire Dainong Group and Midopa collapsed argely from
the strain of defending the takeover. See Midopa Is Declared Bankrupt After
Loan Woes, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1998, at 4.
244 Midopa also attempted to issue privately placed bonds with warrants.
See Sang-hoon Song, Midopa BW bal-haeng gye-hwoek moo-san [Midopa's Plans to
Issue BWs Stopped], JOONGANG ILBO, Feb. 28, 1997, at 8.
245 The bonds would have been convertible before July 1, 1997. Judgment
of Feb. 27, 1997, Seoul Ji-bang-bup-won [District Court], Jae 50 Min-sa-bu
[50th Civil Division], 97 Kkahap 481. See Midopa Issues Bonds in Defensive
Move, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1997, at 13 [hereinafterDefensive Move].
246 Midopa later issued the bonds by changing the terms so that shares
could be converted after July 1, 1997, which would prevent them from being
exercised at Midopa's annual shareholders' meeting in the fall. See Defensive
Move, supra note 245.
247 Mi-do-pa sa-mo CB bal-haeng ban-dae [Korea Investment Trust Objects to
Midopa's Private Placement of CBs], CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 31, 1997, at 1.
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they invested. In Korea, fund managers have tended to be passive
and restrained.248
Overall, several aspects of the HMB and Midopa cases are
noteworthy. First, both cases demonstrated the enormous possi-
bilities and the importance of shareholder rights.249 Second, they
exposed the vulnerability of corporate control in Korean compa-
nies and demonstrated that even firms within chaebol conglomer-
ates were not immune from challenges. Although companies can
no longer issue private placements of bond offerings when facing
hostile threats, the defensive responses by Midopa, and previously
Hanwha, demonstrated the seriousness and urgency of their con-
cerns. 211 In the aftermath of the Hanwha and Midopa incidents,
sixty-eight companies issued such private placements of converti-
ble bonds primarily to secure management control."' Although
248 See Byung-il Yeh, Gi-gwan-too-ja-ga-deul byun-shin [Institutional Investors
Are Changing], CHOSUN ILBO, Feb. 1, 1997, at 8.
249 At one point there was speculation that the Shindongbang Group
might try to take over not only Midopa, but also the entire Dainong Group.
See Sang-hoon Song, Dai-nong num.bo-gi.. . group M&A ga-neung-sung [Interest
in Dainon... Possibility of a Group M&A], JOONGANG ILBO, Mar. 6, 1997.
Another bizarre event indicative of the collusive ties between many chaebol
conglomerates was that the Federation of Korean Industries, composed of the
nation's top chaebols, declared that it would join forces together to defend the
takeover of Midopa. This hasty solution was quickly withdrawn afterpressure
from the Korean Fair Trade Commission. See Namju Cho, Korea Takes New
Step, supra note 48; In-bae Seung,Jae-gye 'uk-dae-juk M&A gong-dong.dae-eung
[Industry Declares that It Will '7ointly Defend Hostile Takeovers 1, CHOSUN
ILBO, Mar. 12, 1997, at 11; Kyung-m'n Chung, M&A gong-dong-dae.eung mot-
han-da [Joint Defense of M&A Cannot Occur], JOONGANG ILBO, Mar. 14, 1997;
Jn-bae Seung, Jae-gye 7uk-dae-juk M&A gong-dong-dae-eung [Industry Declaresthat It Will 'Jointly Defend Hostile Takeovers'].
2"0 See SEA art. 24, SEA Implementing Decree arts. 10, 12-5; see also Sang-
ryul Lee, -yung-young-gwon boon-jaeng-joong-in gi-up: sa-mo-jun-hwan-sa-chae
bal-haeng-geum-ji 1 nyun-gan ]oo-shik-jun-hwan.do bool-huh [Companies Whose
Management Control is in Dispute Prohibited from Private Placement of Con.
vertibe Bonds and Bonds Cannot Be Converted into Stock for One Year],
JOONGANG ILBO, Mar. 20, 1997.
251 See Tae-ung Chung, Sa-mo-jun-hwan-sa.chae bup-won-pan.kyul.ro M&A
tae-ma ban-kam dwoel-deut [The Judicial Decision on Privately Placed Convertible
Bonds Likely to Thwart M&A], KOREA ECON. DAILY, Feb. 9, 1997, at 4; Korean
Firms Issued $1.36 Billion of Convertible Bonds in Quarter, ASIAN WALL ST. J,
Apr. 3, 1997, at 20; Myung-soo Suh, Sa-mo-sa-chae joo-sbik keun pok ha-rak [Pri-
vately Placed CB Stocks Drop by Big Margins], JOONGANG ILBO, Feb. 7, 1997, at
3; see also Kil-yong Ahn, Sa-mo-sa-cbae-ui moon- 'ae-jum gum-to mit dae-chek [Re-
viewing the Problems and Solutions for Private Placement Bonds], 37SANG-JANG-
HYUP 119, 130 (1998) (describing how companies have used private placement
of bonds to protect their management control in recent years).
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unsuccessful, these two cases were nevertheless the first serious
hostile takeover attempts to occur in Korean corporate history.
4.3. Seeking Management Accountability: Korea First Bank
In terms of capturing the attention of Korean management,
perhaps no event had a greater impact than the case of Korea First
Bank ("KFB"), once one of Korea's premier banks. As the pri-
mary lending bank to a string of failed chaebols that collapsed in
spectacular fashion, including the Hanbo Group, Kia Group, and
Sammi Group, the government was forced to nationalize KFB in
February 1998.252 KFB's troubles exemplified the ineffective cor-
porate governance of financial intermediaries in Korea. Un-
checked by shareholders, Korean banks were always highly sus-
ceptible to outside pressures.
First, KFB management faced tough questions from organized
shareholders regarding their roles in the Hanbo Group scandal
during the annual shareholders' meeting held in March 1997.
This marked one of the first times that minority shareholders sys-
tematically and vocally challenged a major corporation's man-
agement at a shareholders' meeting.253 Their most fundamental
rights of participation and voting were exercised. KFB manage-
ment crudely tried to prevent shareholders from participating in
the annual shareholders' meeting and then managed to summarily
steamroll through various management proposals. However, mi-
nority shareholders later brought legal actions challenging the
procedural breaches, irregularities, and validity of the resolutions
made at this annual shareholders' meeting.
Two significant court decisions emerged from the events sur-
rounding the failure of KFB. First, in a critical case, the Seoul
District Court held that the resolutions of the annual sharehold-
25 See Michael Schuman, Korea Watches, Waits as Sammi Group Seeks Court
Protection from Creditors, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1997, at 1.
" See Myung-jae Lee, Jae-il-eun joo-chong. . . sung-nan so-aek-joo-joo-deul
[KFB Shareholders' Meeting ... Angry Minority Shareholders], DONGA ILBO
(Seoul), Mar. 8, 1997, at 37. Minority shareholders also raised serious chal-
lenges at KFB's 1998 and 1999 shareholders' meetings. See Tae-ung Chung &
Hong-yul Kim, Eun-heng sal-ja-go so-aek-joo-joo da jook-ih-na [Sacrificing All the
Minority Shareholders to Save the Bank], KOREA ECON. DAILY, Mar. 3, 1999;
Hong-id Kim & Byung-il Yeh, Boo-shil-chek-im chu-goong-jung-chek-bi-pan 'bot-
mooP: eun-haeng-joo-chong "dae-byun-hwa' [Wood' of Questioning Responsibility
for Mismanagement and Criticizing Policies: 'Great Change' in Bank Shareholders'
Meetings], CHOSUN ILBO, Feb. 28, 1998, at 9.
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ers' meeting should be cancelled because of the various procedural
errors that occurred. They specifically cited the failure to give
objecting shareholders a chance to express their views." 4 The
Court stated that its decision disregarded how companies may
have conducted shareholders' meetings in the past. For the first
time, a court accepted a minority shareholder's petition to cancel
resolutions that were passed at a shareholders' meeting.
255
Next, furious KFB stockholders initiated the first-ever share-
holder derivative action in Korea. 6 Shareholders claimed that
over 1.1 trillion won (U.S. $916.6 million) in bad loans to the
Hanbo Group in particular led to over 270 billion won (U.S. $225
million) in losses to the bank."' KFB management allegedly re-
ceived bribes in return for these loans. In a historic decision, the
Seoul District Court not only found KFB directors responsible
for mismanagement and misconduct, but awarded a record forty
billion won (U.S. $33.3 million) judgment against four former
KFB directors on behalf of the shareholders2 8
2" See Judgment of Dec. 12, 1997, Seoul Chi-bang-bup-won [District
Court], Jae 22 Hap-ui-min-sa-bu [22nd Civil Division], 97 Kahap 32890; seealso
Chang-won Lee & Sung-soo Bang, So-aek-joo-joo moo-shi.han joo-chong-gyul-ui-
neun moo-byo [Shareholders' Meeting Resolutions that Disregarded Minority
Shareholders Is Void], CHOSUN ILBo, Dec. 13, 1997, at 27. Other recent exam-
ples of successful actions against shareholders' meetings include Judgment of
Feb. 2, 1999, Seoul Chi-bang-bup-won [District Court], Jae 14 Hap-ui-min-sa-
bu [14th Civil Division], 98 Kahap 24407.
" See Lee & Bang, sqpra note 254. On appeal, however, the Seoul High
Court reversed the cancellation of the resolutions of the shareholders' meeting
primarily because of the overwhelming consequences to shareholders and the
Korean economy that would have resulted. See Judgment of Aug. 25, 1998,
Seoul Go-deung-bup-won [High Court], Jae 9 Min-sa-boo,98 Na 5267. The
High Court did emphasize that otherwise it would be proper to cancel the
resolutions of the meeting.
256 See Dae-yon Kim, Joo-joo-dae-pyo-so-song-gwa gyong-young-pan-dan.ui.
won-chik [Shareholder Derivative Actions and the Business Jutdgment Rule], 17
COM. L. REV. 111 (1999); see also Hong-yul Kim,oJae-il-eunhaeng so-aek-joo0joo.
deul i-sajin-sang-dae son-shil-bo-jun chung.goo so-song [Minority Shareholde-s of
KFB Bring Suit Against Directors], CHOSUN ILBo, Apr. 11, 1997; Jin-woo Lee,
Gook-nae choi-cho jooJoo dae-pyo so-song.., cham-yuh.yon-dae, jae-il-eun-haeng
goo-gyong-young- in sang-dae [First Shareolder Derivative Suit in Korea... Peo.
pies Solidarity -or Participatory Democracy Against the Former Management of
KFB], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, June 3, 1997.
" PSPD was able to gather 894,702 shares to barely meet the new lowered
0.5% holding requirement of 820,000 shares under the SEA that became effec-
tive April 1, 1997. See Hong-yul Kim, supra note 256.
" See Judgment of July 24, 1998, Seoul Chi-bang-pop-won [District
Court], Jae 17 Min-sa-hap-ui-bu [17th Civil Division], 98 Kahap 39907; Byung-
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The compensatory award of the shareholder derivative action
and the cancellation of the shareholders' meeting had a powerful
impact on the burgeoning shareholder movement." 9 The cases
served to impress upon Korean management the importance of
their responsibilities and duties to their shareholders and the con-
sequences they may face as a result of their decisions.
4.4. Monitoring Management Decisions: Samsung Electronics
and SK Telecom
Recent investor pressure against some of Korea's premier blue
chip companies has sent a powerful message that all companies161
must pay heed to their shareholders. In March 1998, organized
shareholders attended the Samsung Electronics Corporation's an-
nual shareholders' meeting and questioned its management about
a variety of business decisions at unprecedented levels. 6 Instead
moon Gong, Jun-jik-eun-haeng-jangdeung 4 myung-ae 400 uhk won bae-sang pan-
gyul [400 Billion Won Judgment Against Four Including Former Bank President],
L. TIMES (Seoul), July 27, 1998, at 2; Slater,supra note 30 (stating that "the de-
cision sent shock waves through boardrooms").
'9 See Dae-yon Kim, supra note 256, at 111-12. Other notable examples of
shareholder lawsuits that were raised thereafter include an action brought by
minority shareholders against Korea Telecom and Samsung Electronics. See In-
soon Kim, supra note 69; infra Section 4.4. Minority shareholders also recently
brought a 67 billion won (U.S. $55 million) shareholder derivative action
aganst the directors of the now defunct Daedong Bank. See Ui-ho Song, Twoe-
chool.eun-haeng so-aek-joo-joo chut so-song [Minority Shareholder's First Lawsuit
Against Defunct Bank],JOONGANG ILBO, Oct. 30, 1998, at 31.
260 See Kan -eun Lee, So-aek-joo-joo-dae-pyo chut seung-so/ui-mi-wa gwa-jang
[First Shareholder Derivative Suit Victory/leaning and Impact], DONGA ILBO,
July 24, 1998, at 3.
261 See Hae-won Choi, supra note 209, at 13 (noting that "[i]nvestors are
watching a new indicator in South Korea: minority-s areholder activism");
Seong C. Gweon, Yes, There Is Hope, KOREA HERALD, Mar. 31, 1998 ([T]he
best thing to happen is that shareholders, nothing but owners, pay attention to
their own wealth and interests. What happened to both SK Telecom and Sam-
sung Electronics must have sent a clear message to the 'owners' of companies
in this country.").
262 See Naniju Cho, Halting Pace of Korea Inc. Reforms Is Highlighted:- Sam-
sung Electronics Meeting Indicates Sharehom Have Far to Go in Asserting Them-
selves, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1998, at 4. The management of Samsung
Electronics was specifically questioned on its relation to Samsung's disastrous
venture into the automobile industry and its near billion dollar failed invest-
ment in the U.S. personal computer manufacturer AST. Shareholders also
challenged the propriety of Samsung Electronics' private issuance of converti-
ble bonds to the son of the chairman of the Samsung Group at a tremendous
discount. See id.
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of a somnolent and scripted thirty-minute affair, the meeting
lasted for a record sixteen hours.263
Shareholders proceeded to exercise their various newfound
rights under the KCC. Shareholders first requested an inspection
of the contents of the board of directors' minutes.2" The man-
agement of Samsung Electronics initially did not comply with
this request, but changed its position when the Suwon District
Court issued a three million won fine against it.265 Shareholders
then commenced a shareholder derivative action against various
directors of Samsung Electronics on several counts. The action
included claims concerning bribes paid to two former presidents
and illegal trading with its subsidiaries 6.2  These various events
forced many to realize that even Korea's premier companies must
not disregard the interests of their shareholders and helped reori-
ent companies to understanding that management must in fact re-
spect the interests of their shareholders.267
In contrast, at about the same time in March 1998, the man-
agement of SK Telecom ("SKT") accepted a host of shareholder
demands before its annual shareholders' meeting.268  Such an ac-
ceptance was a milestone in Korean corporate history. This
agreement followed the first proxy solicitation initiated by a for-
263 See id. In the 1999 annual shareholders' meeting, shareholders raised
additional issues. Attempts to negotiate a compromise failed, and Samsung
Electronics was able to obtain the necessary votes to amend its articles of in-
corporation to exclude cumulative voting. See Young-i Lee, So-aek-ju-ju 4-dae-
group ju-chong kyuk-dol [Minority Shareholders of 4 Major Groups Clash at Share-
hoder Meetings], DONGA ILBO, Mar. 21, 1999.
264 See KCC art. 396.
265 See Hyo-jae Lee, I-sa-hwoi-gi-rok yeol-lam-guh-bu, chae.bol-ae gwa.tae-ryo
bu-gwa [Rejection of Inspection of Board ofDirectors Minutes Leads to Fine Against
Chaebol], CHOSUN ILBO, June 13, 1998.
266 See Myung-jin Lee, [Cham-yuh-yon-dae] Sam-sung-jun-ja gyung-young-jin-
sang-dae son-hae-bae-sang [PSPD Files a Compensatory Action Against SEC's Man-
agement], CHOSUN ILBO, Oct. 20, 1998.
267 See Don Kirk, Shareholders Take on Big Seoul Firms, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Mar. 22, 1999, at 11 ("Shareholders' meetings, traditionally pro forma
affairs in which the executives of large companies faced no criticism, much less
opposition, took a different turn this year because of South Korea's economic
crisis.").
268 See Seong C. Gweon, supra note 241; Byung-soo Kim, So.aek-joo-joo-
woon.dong cham-yuh-yun-dae-SK hap-ui-ui ui-mi [Minority Shareholder Move-
ment: Meaning of the PSPD-SK Agreement], HANGYORAE SHINMUN (Seoul),
Mar. 26, 1998; Jong-won Koh & Soon-hyun Hwang, Chae-bol-do 'too-myung
gyung-young" yak-so ba-da-nae [Obtaining a 'Transparent Management' Promise
rom a Chaebol], CHOSUN 11B0, Mar. 27, 1998, at 9.
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eign shareholder.269 SKT's management not only agreed to elect
two outside directors and an independent auditor, but also agreed
to accept the candidates chosen by shareholders to act in these po-
sitions."
Next, several important amendments were made to the arti-
cles of incorporation. The new articles of incorporation provide
that interconglomerate trading within the SK Group between re-
lated or sister companies that are in excess of ten billion won
(U.S. $8.33 million) must be approved by a majority of the out-
side directors. As a result, outside directors were recently able to
reclaim 300 billion won (U.S. $216 million) that was subsidized in
the form of commercial paper to several sister companies. 1 SKT
also agreed to recover 300,000 shares that were improperly given
to a sister company.2' Overall, in 1998, outside directors
amended six out of twelve interconglomerate deals that they re-
viewed and rejected two deals altogether. ' These efforts by out-
side directors and auditors in particular were among the most
successful examples of internal supervision under the new corpo-
rate environment. ' 4
Despite this progress in 1998, management consistently re-
jected various proposals by shareholders in 1999. First, they
amended the company's articles of incorporation to exclude cu-
269 See Gwang-am Chun, 'Tiger' deung 4 gae woe-gook-gae fund SK Telecom
foo-joo-gwon' noon-dok [Four Foreign Funds Including Tiger Eye 'Shareholder
Rights' in SK Telecom], DONGA ILBO, Mar. 17, 1998, at 21.
27 See Jon E. Hilsenrath, Directors Get Tough with SK Telecom, ASIAN
WALL ST. J, Sept. 29, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Hilsenrath, Directors Get Tough];
Jon E. Hilsenrath, In Seoul. Tiger Won Telecom Fight but Locals May Win War,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1998, at 19 [hereinafter Hilsenrath, Tiger Won].
Another significant point was that foreign investors for one of the first re-
corded times joined minority investors in officially making various demands
towards management. See Hong-gi Kim & Soon-hyung Hwang, Woe-gook-fund
joo-chong pyo-dae-gyul" sun-un [Foreign Funds Declare a "Shareholders' Meeting
Vote Chalege'], CHOSUN ILBO, Mar. 17, 1998, at 12.
271 See Hilsenrath, Directors Get Tough, supra note 270, at 1; Soon-hyun
Hwang, Sa-woe i-sa wui-ryuk gwa-shi' [Outside Directors 'Demonstrate' Their
Power], CHOSUN ILBO, Oct. 1, 1998, at 27.
272 See Hwang, supra note 271, at 27.
2 See Sa-woe i-sa: sung-gong sa-rae-SK Telecom [Outside Directors: A Success-
ful Case- SK Telecom], MAEIL Bus. NEWS, Mar. 16, 1999.
27 See id. (citing how, unlike other corporations, the outside directors held
over 80 discussion meetings and how outside directors were selected by minor-
ity shareholders).
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mulative voting. '  Furthermore, SKT's outside auditor became
the first auditor to call a shareholders' meeting under the newly
established Article 412-3. The auditor convened the meeting be-
cause of his objections to a controversial new stock issue." 6
Nevertheless, SKT's management was praised for its initial
willingness to accept a considerable degree of the proposals by its
shareholders at the time.' Some skeptics, of course, claim that
these changes were only possible because management could not
afford to ignore foreign investors, who held more than a thirty-
three percent stake at the time."8 Yet, SKT announced it would
be willing to establish an audit committee for the company, one
of the first in Korea. 9 Overall, the managerial changes accom-
plished in the SKT case offer a glimpse into the future of corpo-
rate governance in Korea."'
275 This became possible because, in contrast to the government's overall
efforts to strengthen accountability and transparency through the adoption of
cumulative voting, the critical 18% stake of SKT held by Korea Telecom, a
public enterprise, voted with management to exclude cumulative voting. See
Sung-gun Cho, Jip-jung-too-pyo-jae-ui hyang-bang [The Future Direction of the
Cumulative Voting System], KOREA ECON. DAILY, Mar. 22, 1999.
276 See Ji-hun Lee, Chae-bol-chong-soo hae-im-an joo-chong-su chut-pyo.gyul
[First Vote at Shareholders' Meeting on Termination of a Chaebol Chairman],
CHOSUN ILBO, Aug. 28, 1999.
m See Hilsenrath & Cho, supra note 204, at 1 (noting that it is "likely to
be regarded as a landmark"). For comments on the limitations of the SKT case
and some of the negative aspects of its management, see Jon E. Hilsenrath,Re-
thinking Asia: The Search for Solutions, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1998, at S4;
Craig Karmin & Jane L. Lee, Fund Managers Object to Plan for Korean Issue,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 17, 1999, at 1.
28 The limitation on foreign ownership of SKT which exists under a spe-
cial law was raised to 49% as of July 1, 1999. See Electronic Communication
Business Law, Law No. 4394 of 1991 (amended Law No. 5385 of 1997), arts. 6,
7.
' See Soon-Hyun Hwang, SK Telecom gom-sa-hyub-ui-hwoe-ui-hwoe chul-
bum [SK Telecom Establishes Audit Committee], CHOSUN ILBO, May 13, 1999.
280 One of the most significant signs of progress recently occurred when
Dacom, Korea's leading internet service provider and part of the LG conglom-
erate, accepted proposals of PSPD. Among other things, Dacom agreed both
to elect half of its eight directors as outside directors, and to establish an audit
committee with two-thirds of its members as outside directors. Both of these
measures occurred one year ahead of the SEA's requirements. PSPD has been
given the right to nominate two of the outside directors. Dacom has also
agreed to require that the audit committee approve interconglomerate trading
and special issues of stocks and bonds. See Business in South Korea: Career Path,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 2000, at 59-60; Ji-hoon Lee & Hee-chun Cho,So.aek.juju.
un-dong chut gyul-shil ... Dacom tu-myung-hwa-hab-ui [First Fruits for Minority
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5. CONCLUSION: REORIENTATION OF CORPORATE KOREA
AND ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
The recent revisions to the Commercial Code mark a signifi-
cant transition in Korea's corporate regulatory environment. All
of these reforms should be consolidated by the following factors.
First, foreign investors will increasingly play a larger role in Ko-
rean corporations and the utilization of the KCC."' The owner-
ship restrictions for foreign investors have been completely lifted
in almost all listed companies."2 As of May 25, 1998, foreign in-
vestors are no longer restricted from hostile takeovers.283 Foreign
investors, in fact, already own twenty percent of the total volume
of listed stock on the Korea Stock Exchange, including majority
shares in several blue chip companies. 4
Representatives of foreign investors sit on the board of direc-
tors of such institutions as Korea Exchange Bank and SKT.85
While they still might be hesitant at present, companies realize
that foreign investors will not be as passive as Korean sharehold-
ers. Companies with large foreign ownership must particularly
pay attention.286 For instance, Samsung Electronics and SKT,
which both have substantial foreign ownership, have been paying
Shareholder Movement... Dacom Agrees to Become Transparent], CHOSUN ILBO,
Mar. 7, 2000.
281 See Hong-ryul Chun, supra note 110, at 76-77; Charles Lee, Business In-
vestment: Open Sesame: South Korea Warms Toward Foreign Investors, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Dec. 24, 1998, at 51 (citing recent examples of foreign investment
such as Volvo's U.S. $720 million purchase of Samsung's construction-
equipment division, BASF's U.S. $600 million purchase of Daesang's animal-
feed-additive business and British Telecom's U.9. $373 million equity stake in
LG Telecom).
282 The foreign ownership restriction was lifted on May 25, 1998, exclud-
ing certain public companies. See Foreign Securities Trading Regulation, Fi-
nancial Supervisory Service.
283 See Foreigner Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement Act, Law
No. 5538 of 1998 mended by Foreigner Investment Promotion Act, Law No.
Sept. 16, 1998).
284 See [Joo-*oo.chong-hwoe] Hot Issue... 5 dae group 5 gae gi-up si-kkeu-rop-da
[Hot Issues at Sha reholders'Meetings... Noisy at the Five Largest Companies of the
Five Largest Groups], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Mar. 3, 1999.
285 See Sara Webb, Asian Companies Open Themselves Up to Foreigners,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 28, 1998, at 22.
286 See generally Jane L. Lee & Hae Won Choi, Korean Firms Resist Change
at Key Meetings, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1999, at 1 (noting that foreign
shareholders were more active in the current year's shareholders' meetings).
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heightened attention to the demands of foreign shareholders. 8
Overall, a significant but subtle disciplining effect on Korean cor-
porate governance is emerging.288
In addition to foreign investors, Korean institutional inves-
tors, which now own almost thirty-five percent of the total listed
shares, are also on the brink of becoming more active actors.28 9
Until last year, institutional investors have been restricted in ex-
ercising their voting rights from customer accounts.29 At most,
they occasionally objected to mergers or merely claimed appraisal
rights.291 As witnessed in the annual shareholders' meetings that
were held in the spring of 1999, overall they still remained pas-
sive.292 Most institutional investors, for instance, generally ab-
stained or voted against the adoption of cumulative voting.293
Yet, with the explosion of closed-end funds and unit trust invest-
ment in 1999, and the consequent increase in competition among
institutional investors, this predisposition is likely to change.
28 See Bong-kwon Park, Samsung Electronics, SK Telecom, Korea Telecom
deungfjip-jung-too-pyo-jae bae-jae-ae woe-gook-in hyup-jo [Samsung Electronics, SK
Telecom, Korea Telecom Seek Cooperation of Foreigners in Excluding Cumulative
Voting], MAEIL Bus. NEWS, Mar. 12, 1999.
288 See Hae-won Choi, supra note 209, at 13 (noting that "foreign investors
praise the changes pushed through by minority shareholders"); Sung-il Hong,
Woe-gook-in-ji-boon man-eun sang-Jang-sa-deul joo-chong bi-sang [Listed Compa-
nies with Large Foreign Ownership on Alert for Their Shareholders' Meetings],
JOONGANG ILBO, Jan. 10, 1998, at 25; Moon Ihlwan,supra note 204, at 52;.
289 See KSE, Joo-shik [Stock], Apr. 1999; Jae-won Lee, supra note 27, at 164;
Hong-ryul Chun, supra note 110, at 77.
290 See Jae-won Lee, supra note 27, at 167-77.
291 See Gi-gwan gi-up-gyung-yong gam-shi na-sut-da [Institutional Investors
Begin Monitoring Corporate Management], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Feb. 27, 1997;
Yoon-jae Han, Gi-gwan-too-ja-ga ui-gyul-gwon juk-geuk haeng-sa-reul [Institu-
tional Investors Should Actively Exercise Voting Rights], CHOSUN ILBO, June 30,
1999, at 6 (providing a list of some of the rare instances where institutional in-
vestors have raised their objections).
292 See Hun-soo Kim & Yong-hae Choi jip-jung-too-pyo-Jae non.lan... sang.
jang-sa bae-jae-chu-jin-ae gi-gwan-too-ja-ga Ju, ji na-suh [iispute Concerning Cu.
mulative Voting... Institutional Investors Seek to Block Attempts by Listed Com-
panies to Exclude Provision], MAEIL Bus. NEWS, Feb. 12, 1999. But cf. Jae-oh
Yoon, 12 wol gyul-san sang-Jang-sa joo-chong i-bun-joo-boo-tuh bon-gyuk gae-mak
[Listed Companies with Accounting Years Ending in December Commence Share-
holders'Meetings This Week], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Feb. 21, 1999 (describing that
Daehan Investment Trust and Korea Investment Trust did object to a recent
merger between Hyundai Motors and Hyundai Motor Service).
293 See Hun-soo Kim & Yong-hae Choi, supra note 292.
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Furthermore, Korea is facing considerable peer pressure from
international organizations such as the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") to modify its
corporate regulations to reflect newly emerging international
standards.294 Korea accepted various aspects of the OECD pro-
posals. Among the reforms adopted, outside directors must com-
prise one-quarter of the board of listed companies.29 Although
outside directors face limitations in all corporate systems, overall
they should be able to provide additional checks and balances to
the management structure dominated by the principal sharehold-
ers. Moreover, large companies and securities firms with assets of
over two trillion won face even stricter standards.296 First, they
must elect at least three outside directors to their boards in 2000
and more than half by 2001. These outside directors also must
be elected through nominating committees. Second, they must
establish audit committees where more than two-thirds of their
members are outside directors.29 In light of the significant posi-
tion of financial companies, the standard holding requirements to
exercise shareholders rights have been lowered by an additional
fifty percent in the case of shareholders of securities companies.299
The 1995, 1998, and 1999 revisions to the KCC represent the
third, fourth, and fifth amendments in a period of over thirty
years. Although various changes still need to be made, unimagin-
able progress has been achieved at an alarming pace. The onset of
the Korean financial crisis in late 1997 ironically served as a cata-
lyst for further reforms. Korea attempted to tackle some of the
central problems of its corporate regulation such as the lack of ac-
294 See Yong-yool Kim, Woo-ri-na-ra-ui gi-up-ji-bae-goo-jo mo-bum-gyu-yak
jae-jung ui-ui-wa bang-hyang [The Meaning and Future Direction of the Establish-
ment of Best Practices-for Korean Corporate Governance], 39 SANG-JANG-HYUP 9
(1999).
295 See SEA art. 191-16.
296 See id.; SEA arts. 54-5, 54-6.
297 See SEA art. 191-16, annex art. 8.
29' See SEA arts. 191-17, 54-6. See generally Bup-gae-jung jak-up so-gae [In-
troducing Preparations of Law Amendments], L. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at 3; Bok-
ki Hong, I-sa-hwoe-wa geu ui-won-hwoe: gam-sa-ui-won-hwoe-ui do-ip-yuh-boo-ae
dae-ban gum-to [Board of Directors and Its Committees: Reviewing the Possibility
ofAdopting Audit Committees], 39 SANG-JANG-HYUP 51 (1999); Jong-ho Kwon,
ll-bon-ui gi-upji-bae-goo-jo dong-byang-gwa woo-ri-na-ra gam-sa-jae-do-ui gae-sun
[Recent Trends in Japanese Corporate Governance and Improving the Korean
Audit System], 39 SANG-JANG-HYUP 72 (1999).
299 See SEA art. 64.
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countability in corporate governance, weak directors and audi-
tors, ineffective shareholder rights, and transparency standards.
External corporate governance has been promoted by facilitating
mergers and acquisitions.
Various reforms still need to be pursued. Class actions suits
are still not permitted. Although a proposed law to permit class
actions has been drafted, it has continued to linger in the National
Assembly.3" Despite the recent amendments, the current thresh-
old shareownerhip requirements still act as a barrier to the exer-
cise of shareholder rights and need to be lowered further.
Nevertheless, the recent amendments to Korea's Commercial
Code should increase the competitiveness of corporate Korea. In-
stead of operating in a vacuum, Korean corporations can only be-
come more efficient institutions by finally facing at least some de-
gree of monitoring controls and internal and external corporate
governance discipline. These changes can only serve to enhance
the international competitiveness of corporate Korea.
" See The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (visited Nov. 1,
1999) < http://www.assembly.go.kr >. The IMF initially requested the inclu-
sion of class action suits. See Gyung-ho Yoon, So-soo-joo-joo fib-dan-so-song.jae
[Minority Shareholder Class Action], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Dec. 24, 1997.
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